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Abstract
The advantages of using public key cryptography over secret key cryptography
include the convenience of better key management and increased security.
However, due to the complexity of the underlying number theoretic algorithms,
public key cryptography is slower than conventional secret key cryptography,
thus motivating the need to speed up public key cryptosystems.
A mathematical object called an elliptic curve can be used in the construction
of public key cryptosystems. This thesis focuses on speeding up elliptic
curve cryptography which is an attractive alternative to traditional public key
cryptosystems such as RSA. Speeding up elliptic curve cryptography can be
done by speeding up point arithmetic algorithms and by improving scalar
multiplication algorithms. This thesis provides a speed up of some point
arithmetic algorithms. The study of addition chains has been shown to be
useful in improving scalar multiplication algorithms, when the scalar is fixed.
A special form of an addition chain called a Lucas chain or a differential
addition chain is useful to compute scalar multiplication on some elliptic
curves, such as Montgomery curves for which differential addition formulae
are available. While single scalar multiplication may suffice in some systems,
there are others where a double or a triple scalar multiplication algorithm
may be desired. This thesis provides triple scalar multiplication algorithms
in the context of differential addition chains. Precomputations are useful in
speeding up scalar multiplication algorithms, when the elliptic curve point is
fixed. This thesis focuses on both speeding up point arithmetic and improving
scalar multiplication in the context of precomputations toward double scalar
multiplication. Further, this thesis revisits pairing computations which use
elliptic curve groups to compute pairings such as the Tate pairing. More
specifically, the thesis looks at Stange’s algorithm to compute pairings and
also pairings on Selmer curves. The thesis also looks at some aspects of the
underlying finite field arithmetic.
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Chapter 1
Cryptography and Elliptic
Curves
This chapter provides an overview of the use of elliptic curves in cryptography.
We first provide a brief background to public key cryptography and the
Discrete Logarithm Problem, before introducing elliptic curves and the elliptic
curve analogue of the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
1.1 Cryptography and the Discrete Logarithm
Problem
While the history of cryptography is probably as old as the history of our
species and has used diverse techniques, contemporary cryptography is the
design, development and analysis of mathematical techniques for secure
communication in the presence of adversaries [51]. The book [92] provides a
very readable account of cryptography.
Typically Alice and Bob communicate with each other over an unsecured
communication channel in the presence of an adversary Eve who intends
to subvert any security services available to Alice and Bob. Cryptographic
systems can be broadly classified into secret key cryptosystems and public
key cryptosystems. If Alice and Bob intend to use a secret key cryptosystem,
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they agree upon a secret key k which is known only to Alice and Bob and
is a secret to the rest of the world. Given a plaintext p, Alice would use a
function f(p, k) to produce the ciphertext c and this is transmitted to Bob.
Bob uses the function g(c, k) to recover the plaintext p. While efficiency is the
main advantage of secret key cryptosystems, the key used by Alice and Bob
should first be exchanged using a secure communication channel. This would
require a second secret key to ensure secrecy of the first and this would then
require a third secret key to ensure secrecy of the second and so on. Even if
this problem were to be resolved by using a physically secure channel such
as a trusted courier, if n entities need to communicate amongst themselves
and if each of these n communications is to be a secret, each communicating
entity should ensure that the n− 1 secret keys are appropriately exchanged
with the other n− 1 entities with whom it communicates. Moreover, a digital
signature scheme where a participant cannot deny previous commitments
cannot be easily constructed using secret key cryptography techniques. The
above problems are satisfactorily overcome by using public key cryptography,
initially introduced in [39].
In public key cryptography, Alice and Bob have two keys each, called a key
pair. Each key pair consists of a private and a public key and it is not easy
to derive the private key from the public key. The relationship between
the private and the public key must be such that it is computationally
difficult to derive the private key, given that the public key is known to the
whole world. The computational difficulty usually depends on the assumed
intractability of number theoretic problems such as integer factorization,
the discrete logarithm problem and its elliptic curve analog. These number
theoretic problems are assumed to be intractable (in the absence of quantum
computers), but intractability is an open problem. They are conjectured to
be neither in complexity class P nor in NP-Complete.
Now we set up the framework for the discrete logarithm problem. We begin
by defining a Group. A Group is a set G which comes with an operation, say
+, usually called the Group Law, which satisfies the following properties:
(i) Closure: If x and y ∈ G, then x+ y ∈ G.
(ii) Associativity: If x, y and z ∈ G, then (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z).
(iii) Identity: There exists an element 0 ∈ G such that x+ 0 = x = 0 + x for
all x ∈ G.
(iv) Inverse: For every element x ∈ G, there exists −x ∈ G, such that
x+ (−x) = 0 = (−x) + x, the identity element of G.
Some of the conditions above may be redundant. If G is a group such that
a+ b = b+ a for all a, b ∈ G, then G is called a commutative or an Abelian
group. For instance, if p is a prime number, Fp = {0, 1, 2, ....p− 1} is the set
of integers modulo p and if + is the addition modulo p operation, then (Fp,+)
is a finite Abelian group where the identity element equals 0. Further, if ∗ is
the multiplication modulo p operation, then (F∗p, ∗) is a multiplicative group
where F∗p = Fp\{0} and the identity element equals 1. The triple (Fp,+, ∗)
is usually written as Fp in the literature and is a Finite Field, where for all
x, y, z ∈ Fp, (x+ y) ∗ z = (x ∗ z) + (y ∗ z). The order of a group is the number
of elements in the group (if finite) or ∞ (if number of elements is infinite).
Thus the order of (Fp,+) is p while the order of (F
∗
p, ∗) is p− 1.
Now, we formulate the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Assume that the group
operation is ∗. Given a fixed element a ∈ G and x a positive integer, it is
possible to compute b ∈ G, where b = ax using a polynomial time algorithm
(ax is defined as ax = a∗a(x−1) if x > 0 and a0 = 1). However, if it is the other
way around, that is, given a, b ∈ G, the problem of determining the least
possible (or any) value of x such that b = ax is called the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) and using current state of the art algorithms, cannot be
computed in polynomial time for groups such as (F∗p, ∗). While it is easy to
construct a polynomial time algorithm to compute the DLP in groups such as
the additive group Z/nZ, the best currently available algorithms for the DLP
in the multiplicative group of a finite field with medium or large characteristic
run in subexponential time (subexponential in the bit-length of the group
order). Recent research has shown that it is possible to construct better
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than sub-exponential algorithms to compute the DLP in finite fields of small
characteristic [6]. The computational complexity of the DLP depends on the
properties of the underlying group such as the order of the group and the
prime factorisation of the order. The order of a is the order of the subgroup
〈a〉 generated by a ∈ G. Groups suitable for public key cryptosystems should
be such that the order of the fixed/base element a should be either a large
prime or the product of a large prime and a very small integer [63, Section 5].
It can be conjectured that the DLP in (F∗p, ∗) where p− 1 has large prime
factors is as hard as factoring integers of size about the same as that of p [83].
A very accessible introduction to computation of discrete logarithms is [87].
The success of public key cryptosystems such as the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange algorithm and the ElGamal encryption algorithm rely on the
assumed intractability of the DLP in a finite cyclic group, sometimes called
the generalized discrete logarithm problem in the literature [77], which can
be stated as follows: Given a finite cyclic group G with a generator a and
group order n and some b ∈ G, compute the integer x, 1 ≤ x ≤ (n − 1)
such that ax = b. (If b is the identity element in G, then x = 0). In the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, Alice and Bob intend to exchange
a secret key between themselves. As part of the initial setup, they choose a
finite cyclic group G with order n and generator a. Then Alice chooses an
integer x at random (1 ≤ x ≤ (n− 1)) and without revealing the value of x
to anybody, computes ax and transmits it to Bob over a public channel. Bob
chooses an integer y at random (1 ≤ y ≤ (n− 1)) and without revealing the
value of y to anybody, computes ay and transmits it to Alice. Alice computes
(ay)x and Bob computes (ax)y, thus resulting in both Alice and Bob sharing
the secret key axy between themselves. An intruder Eve with access to both
ax and ay, may desire to compute axy. The problem that Eve is confronted
with is sometimes called the Generalized Diffie-Hellman problem (GDHP)
in the literature [77]. An efficient algorithm to solve the DLP will enable
Eve to solve the GDHP, as she can compute x and y and thus compute axy,
resulting in the compromise of the cryptosystem. An efficient algorithm to
solve the DLP will not only result in the compromise of the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange algorithm, but also compromise cryptosystems such as the ElGamal
encryption system. It is conjectured that solving the GDHP is equivalent in
difficulty to solving the DLP. However, this conjecture has not been proved
yet.
1.2 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve is a mathematical object that can be studied from a variety
of perspectives: Number Theory, Diophantine Problems, Algebra, Algebraic
Geometry and so on. In the foreword to his book on elliptic curves [65], Lang
writes
It is possible to write endlessly on elliptic curves (This is not a threat).
Recently, elliptic curves played a major role in graduating the celebrated
Fermat’s Last Theorem from the status of a conjecture to a theorem, leading
to a renewed interest in elliptic curves and their study. The use of elliptic
curves in cryptography has led to a commercial interest in elliptic curves.
Thus it is possible to write endlessly and beyond on elliptic curves. In this
thesis, however, we confine ourselves to computational aspects of elliptic curve
cryptography. We now proceed to provide a very short introduction to elliptic
curves and their utility in public key cryptography.
1.2.1 What are Elliptic Curves?
An introduction to elliptic curves can be found in Poonen’s article [88]. Curves
of the form {(x, y) : f(x, y) = 0} where f(x, y) is a polynomial in two variables
are called plane curves. The degree of the curve is the maximum of (i+ j)
when cxiyj is any monomial occurring in f with c 6= 0. While plane curves of
degree 1 are called lines, plane curves of degree 2 are called conic sections or
conics. Plane curves of degree 3 are called cubics. The general form of a cubic is
c1x
3 + c2x
2y + c3xy
2 + c4y
3 + c5x
2 + c6xy + c7y
2 + c8x+ c9y + c10 = 0 (1.1)
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Nonsingular cubic curves with a distinguished rational point defined over the
base field are called Elliptic curves. Equation (1.1) can be transformed into
an equation with the following form [36]:
y2 + a1xy + a3y = f(x) (1.2)
where f(x) is a polynomial of degree 3 and f(x) has no multiple roots. In a
finite field F with identity element 1, the smallest value of n such that
1 + 1 + · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n-1) additions
= 0
is called the characteristic of the field. Over a finite fieldK whose characteristic
is not equal to 2 or 3, one can transform any elliptic curve into one of the
form
y2 = x3 + Ax+B (1.3)
where A and B ∈ K [51]. Any curve of the above form is an elliptic curve
(i.e., without multiple roots) if and only if (4A3 + 27B3) 6= 0.
1.2.2 Why the name Elliptic Curve?
A brief historical introduction to elliptic curves is provided in [102]. For
about one and a half millennia, from the time of Diophantus to Newton,
mathematical properties of certain cubic equations that are today known as
elliptic curves were seen to be generalizations of those of conics. However
the advent of calculus helped highlight marked differences between conics
and elliptic curves. While conic sections can be parameterized by rational
functions, elliptic curves cannot be parameterized by rational functions. The
simplest functions that can parameterize elliptic curves are elliptic functions
encountered in calculus as the inverses of so called elliptic integrals. Elliptic
integrals are called so, as a typical example is the integral for the arc length
of an ellipse. Thus the name elliptic curve.
Interesting introductory expositions to elliptic curves can be found in [21, 22,
66].
1.3 Group Law on Elliptic Curves and the
ECDLP
If we denote the elliptic curve in equation (1.3) as E, we can define the
addition of two points P and Q on E, denoted as P +Q, as follows: Draw
a line connecting P and Q and intersecting E at another point denoted by
P +Q, which in turn is reflected through the x-axis to obtain the point P +Q.
P +Q exists provided P and Q are distinct and not on a vertical line, and is
unique because the equation is a cubic. This is shown below when the field
under consideration is R.
y2 = x3 + Ax+B
x
y
P •
Q•
•P +Q
•P +Q
Figure 1.1: Elliptic Curve Point Addition
For point doubling, (P = Q), the line connecting P and Q becomes the
tangent at P as shown below.
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y2 = x3 + Ax+B
x
y
P•
•2P
•2P
Figure 1.2: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling
Along with all other points (x, y) ∈ K2, where K is the field in which E is
defined, the inclusion of the point (∞,∞), denoted by O is necessary in order
to obtain a group.
We will take the lines through (∞,∞) to be vertical. Thus when P +O is
computed, the line through P = (x, y) and O should intersect E at (x,−y).
Similarly when (x,−y) +O is computed, the line through P = (x,−y) and O
should intersect E at (x, y). Thus P +O = P and P + (−P ) = O. We can
also show that if P,Q and R are points on E, then (P +Q)+R = P +(Q+R).
Also, P + Q = Q + P . Thus the operation of point addition satisfies the
properties of Closure, Associativity, Identity, Inverse and Commutativity
thereby ensuring that the set of points on E with the addition operation ′+′
constitutes an Abelian group.
It was possible to draw the elliptic curves shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 above
using Janoski’s document [55].
The earliest use of elliptic curves in areas related to Cryptology was not in
traditional encryption and decryption but in constructing a sub-exponential
algorithm for integer factorization. This algorithm was introduced by Lenstra
in [70] and further enhanced by Brent and Montgomery. For instance, see
[15] [16], [80]. A good reference on elliptic curve factorization is the paper [43].
We can now set up the Elliptic curve analogue of the DLP. If P and Q are
two points on an elliptic curve and given that P = xQ for some integer x
(xQ is defined as xQ = (x− 1)Q+Q if x > 0 and xQ = O when x = 0), then
the problem of finding x given P and Q on E is the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem(ECDLP). One of the advantages of using the ECDLP
as compared to integer factorization or just the DLP is that while there are
sub-exponential algorithms to solve the integer factorization problem and the
DLP, there are no known subexponential algorithms (subexponential in the
bit-length of the curve group order) to solve the ECDLP. (Some instances
of the ECDLP may not be hard. For instance, when the group order can
be written as a product of only small primes, it may be easy to solve the
ECDLP using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm). This advantage translates
into smaller key sizes in an ECDLP based system as compared to key sizes
in integer factorization based systems such as RSA, for the same level of
security. Smaller key sizes make it suitable for elliptic curve cryptosystems
to be deployed in constrained environments such as mobile platforms. The
notions of exponential and subexponential algorithms can be formalized using
the big-O notation [86]. However, in this thesis, we focus on operation counts
to compare point arithmetic algorithms rather than comparing algorithms
from the perspective of classical computational complexity.
While it should be difficult for an adversary Eve to solve the ECDLP, it is
desirable for Alice and Bob to be able to encrypt, decrypt, digitally sign and
verify digital signatures as quickly as possible. In other words, computation
of quantities such as P = xQ or P = xQ + yR, (where P , Q and R are
points on an elliptic curve and x and y are integers) and the group operations
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in the underlying group in which the ECDLP is setup should be made as
fast as possible. This thesis focuses on speeding up elliptic curve arithmetic
including scalar multiplication algorithms. Faster elliptic curve arithmetic not
only facilitates faster cryptography but may also enhance the performance of
cryptanalytic methods.
1.4 Roadmap
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2, we provide an introduction to point arithmetic formulae for
various forms of elliptic curves such as Weierstrass, Montgomery, Edwards,
Huff and Selmer curves with point representations such as affine, projective
coordinates etc. We motivate the need for fast quintupling algorithms and
then (i) show that Giorgi’s quintupling algorithm for Weierstrass curves
can be derived from Mishra’s and Dimitov’s algorithm and (ii) provide new
quintupling formulae for Edwards curves.
In Chapter 3, we provide new differential point tripling formulae for Montgomery
curves and then provide faster differential arithmetic algorithms for Generalized
Edwards and a variant of Binary Edwards curves.
In Chapter 4, we provide new algorithms for triple scalar multiplication
in the context of differential addition chains and compare these algorithms
with the straight-forward method for triple scalar multiplication. In this
chapter, we also provide a context in which the differential tripling formulae
for Montgomery curves can be used.
Making use of results from Chapter 2, we review two algorithms for double
scalar multiplication in Chapter 5. One is based on conjugate addition and
the other on co-Z addition. Whilst reviewing the algorithm based on co-Z
addition, we show that some results published in the literature are incorrect
and in this process provide a new algorithm for double scalar multiplication.
In Chapter 6, we provide an improvement to Stange’s Elliptic Net algorithm
for the Tate pairing and then improve the Tate pairing computation on Selmer
curves.
In Chapter 7, we show that the 3-way Karatsuba algorithm can be derived
from the 2-way Karatsuba algorithm and then provides a new family of
formulae to multiply two quadratics.
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Chapter 2
Arithmetic on Elliptic Curves
and some improvements
In the previous chapter, we looked at the formulation of the group law for the
set of points on an elliptic curve. In this chapter, we look at some formulae
that are used to compute the group operation, that is the formulae related
to elliptic curve point arithmetic. There are various forms of elliptic curves,
such as the Weierstrass curves, Montgomery curves etc and then there are
various forms of point representation on these elliptic curves, such as affine
coordinates, projective coordinates etc. In this chapter, we also review some
formulae for Weierstrass and Edwards curves. We start with Weierstrass
curves.
2.1 Weierstrass Curves
Assume that K is a finite field, char(K) 6= 2, 3. An elliptic curve of the form
E : y2 = x3 + a4x+ a6 where a4 and a6 ∈ K and (4a4 + 27a6) 6= 0
is called a Weierstrass curve. Various point representation systems can be
used to perform point arithmetic operations on elliptic curves. We will first
look at the point representation system in which a curve point is represented
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in the most natural way, which is (x, y). This is the affine coordinate system
and in this system −(x, y) = (x,−y).
2.1.1 Affine Coordinates
If P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) are any two distinct points on E, P 6= O, Q 6=
O and P 6= ±Q, then P +Q = (x3, y3) is given by
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
}
where λ =
(y1 − y2)
(x1 − x2)
If P = Q = (x1, y1) and P 6= −P , then 2P = (x3, y3) is defined as
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1
and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
}
where λ =
3x21 + a4
2y1
Taking I to be the cost of one inversion, M to be the cost of one multiplication
and S to be the cost of one squaring in the field K, then
Addition requires 1I + 2M + 1S operations
and Doubling requires 1I + 2M + 2S operations.
Unless otherwise stated, the cost of the field operations I,M and S are
considered, while the cost of a field addition/subtraction is ignored, since it
is small compared to M/S/I. Though a squaring is clearly a special case
of a multiplication, where the operands are equal, it is useful to distinguish
between these two operations, as it is possible to tune a squaring to provide
a tangible speedup over a multiplication. The best possible speedup factor
is 2 [17, Exercise 1.17]. A good rule of thumb is to take the cost of a
squaring to be about 2/3 that of a multiplication [17, Section 1.3.6, Figure
1.2]. Clearly, these comparisons depend on the underlying implementation of
these operations. and in some implementations, S = 0.8M . Computing an
inverse in K is an expensive operation and typically I > 30M . We denote the
cost of multiplication by a small constant c by Mc. It is useful to distinguish
between M and Mc as special purpose algorithms can be used for constant
multiplication [17, Section 1.3.7].
Next, we look at projective coordinates. The use of projective coordinates
(and its many variants) avoids the use of the inverse operation, whereas
when affine coordinates are used, it is not easy to do away with the inverse
operation.
2.1.2 Projective Coordinates
The homogeneous projective form of the Weierstrass equation can be written
as
E : Y 2Z = X3 + a4XZ
2 + a6Z
3
In this system, (x, y) is replaced with any triple (X, Y, Z) = (xζ, yζ, ζ) where
ζ ∈ K∗. From a triple (X, Y, Z), the affine coordinates can be written
as Affine(X, Y, Z) = (x = X/Z, y = Y/Z). The negative of −(X, Y, Z) is
(X,−Y, Z) while the identity element O corresponds to (0, 1, 0) (This is a
special case having Z = 0, otherwise Z 6= 0). If points P = (X1, Y1, Z1) and
Q = (X2, Y2, Z2) correspond to affine points (X1/Z1, Y1/Z1) and (X2/Z2, Y2/Z2)
respectively, P 6= ±Q, P 6= O and Q 6= O, then the point P+Q = (X3, Y3, Z3)
can be computed as follows:
Computing A = Y2Z1 − Y1Z2,
B = X2Z1 −X1Z2
and C = A2Z1Z2 −B3 − 2B2X1Z2,
we get X3 = BC,
Y3 = A(B
2X1Z2 − C)−B3Y1Z2
and Z3 = B
3Z1Z2
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Similarly, if 2P = (X3 : Y3 : Z3),
Computing A = a4Z
2
1 + 3X
2
1 ,
B = Y1Z1,
C = X1Y1B
and D = A2 − 8C
we get X3 = 2BD,
Y3 = A(4C −D)− 8Y 21 B2
and Z3 = 8B
3
Addition requires (12M + 2S) operations and doubling requires (7M + 5S)
operations
Since every addition or a doubling in affine coordinates requires one inversion
operation, the number of inversions increases with the number of point
additions or doublings required. Use of projective coordinates avoids this
problem, but at the cost of additional memory, as Z-coordinates for all of
the points being processed need to be stored as well. In this context, it may
be appropriate to quote the research problem 7.25 posed by Crandall and
Pomerance in [35] which states
“ . . . One looks longingly at expressions x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, y3 = λ(x1 −
x3)−y1, in the realization that if only inversion were ‘free’, the affine approach
would be superior. However, known inversion methods are quite expensive.
One finds in practice that inversion times tend to be one or two orders of
magnitude greater than multiply-mod times . . . it is very hard to bring down
the cost of inversion(modulo a typical cryptographic prime p ≈ 2200) to 20
multiplies . . . ”.
Continuing with the above research question, the authors of [35] motivate
readers to think about primes of special forms, use look up tables and
specialized gcd algorithms for modular inversion with the aim of reducing
the impact of the high computational costs of inversion in affine coordinates.
Whilst one way of overcoming the costs of inversion is to reduce the cost
of computing the inversion, a complementary way to do this is to try to
reduce the number of inversions required. In recent years, there has been
some research in this direction.
To begin with, the authors in [45] introduced a new method to reduce the
number of operations required to be computed when affine coordinates are
used. This method may be called the 2P + Q method or “Double-Add”
method. We next look at this method.
2.1.3 2P +Q/Double-Add Method
If P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) are two points on E : y
2 = x3 + a4x + a6, then
2P +Q = (x4, y4) can be computed as below:
We could first compute P +Q = (x3, y3) as
x3 = λ
2
1 − x1 − x2
and y3 = (x1 − x3)λ1 − y1
}
where λ1 =
(y2 − y1)
(x2 − x1)
To obtain 2P +Q = (x4, y4), P +Q = (x3, y3) can be added to P = (x1, y1).
Thus
x4 = λ
2
2 − x1 − x3
y4 = (x1 − x4)λ2 − y1
}
where λ2 =
(y3 − y1)
(x3 − x1)
Now λ2 can be written as
λ2 =
y3 − y1
x3 − x1 =
(x1 − x3)λ1 − y1
(x3 − x1) = −λ1 −
2y1
(x3 − x1)
A straightforward computation of P+Q = (x3, y3) would require (1I+2M+1S)
and similarly computing (P +Q) + P would require another (1I + 2M + 1S),
thus requiring a total of (2I + 4M + 2S). However, in the above equation for
λ2, y3 need not be computed thus saving 1M . Thus (2P+Q) can be computed
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using (2I + 3M + 2S) operations. This can be extended to computing 3P
and (3P +Q) as well.
2P +Q requires (2I + 3M + 2S) operations
3P requires (2I + 3M + 3S) operations
3P +Q requires (3I + 4M + 3S) operations
Thus whilst the 2P+Q method reduces the number of multiplications required,
it does not reduce the number of inversions required. However, in a subsequent
paper [27], Ciet, Joye, Lauter and Montgomary reduce the number of
inversions required by using the trick of simultaneous inverse computation.
This can be called the Enhanced 2P+Q method, which we describe below:
2.1.4 Enhanced 2P +Q Method
As seen previously, whilst computing (2P + Q) as ((P + Q) + P ), y3 need
not be computed. It turns out that x3 need not be computed as well.
2P +Q = (x4, y4) can be computed directly as follows:
x4 can be equated to (λ2 − λ1)(λ1 + λ2) + x2
Letting d = (x2−x1)2(2x1+x2)−(y2−y1)2, we see that d = (x2−x1)2(x1−x3)
Defining D = d(x2 − x1) and I = D−1 we have
1
x2 − x1 = dI and
1
(x1 − x3) = (x2 − x1)
3I
Counting the number of operations required to compute x4 and y4 results
in (1I + 9M + 2S) thus reducing the number of inversions required. This
method could be extended to compute 3P, (3P +Q), 4P and (4P +Q).
2P +Q requires (1I + 9M + 2S) operations
3P requires (1I + 7M + 4S) operations
3P +Q requires (2I + 9M + 4S) operations
4P requires (1I + 9M + 9S) operations
4P +Q requires (2I + 11M + 4S) operations
Whilst the ideas in [45, 27] were further extended and generalized in a
2007 paper [37] by Dahmen, Okeya and Schapers(DOS), where the authors
precompute all odd points 3P, 5P . . . (2k − 1)P, k ≥ 2 in affine coordinates
for elliptic curves over a prime field, whilst requiring (10k−11)M+(4k)S+1I
operations to compute these points and they use 2(k−1) registers, the authors
in [67] used the same ideas to provide a faster affine point Quadrupling
scheme for Weierstrass curves over a prime field costing (1I + 8M + 8S).
The DOS algorithm was then adapted by the authors in [42] to precompute
2P, 3P, 5P . . . (2k − 1)P, k ≥ 2 in affine coordinates for elliptic curves over a
field of char 2 and their algorithm required (11k−13)M+(2k)S+1I operations.
There are other ways using which the number of inversion computations
can be reduced. The story of reducing the number of inversions in affine
representation did not begin with [27]. One of the earliest attempts at doing
this can be seen in [29]. Using the well known Montgomery inversion trick,
the authors in [29] first compute 2P , and then subsequently compute
(3P, 4P ), (5P, 7P, 8P ) . . . , ((k.2−2 + 1)P, . . . , (k.2−1 − 1)P, (k.2−1P )),
((k.2−1 + 1)P, . . . , (k− 1)P ) thus reducing the number of inverses required to
be computed from k to (dlog2 ke+ 1).
Further, Okeya, Takagi and Vuillaume in [85] introduced the idea of computing
P ± Q simultaneously, whilst saving one inversion in the process. Then,
at ECC 2008, Michael Scott motivated the further use of this idea in
precomputation schemes, not confined to affine coordinates. Taking this
useful idea further, Longa and Gebotys in [72] provide new precomputation
schemes for projective coordinates on Weierstrass, Jacobi Quartic and Edwards
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curves. A precomputation algorithm structurally similar to that of in [72] was
constructed by Le and Tan in [68]. We revisit some of these precomputation
schemes further in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
The motivation in using the 2P + Q or the enhanced 2P + Q method or
the DOS algorithm to precompute 3P, 5P . . . (2k − 1)P is to trade field
inversions for multiplications when elliptic curve points, for efficiency reasons,
are represented in affine coordinates. The 2P +Q method can also be used
to efficiently compute 3P [27]. These methods can be used in cryptographic
protocols where the elliptic curve points such as P and Q are not fixed, and
thus the precomputations cannot be performed oﬄine [37].
Next we look at Jacobian coordinates, a derivative of projective coordinate
point representation.
2.1.5 Jacobian Coordinates
The weighted projective form of the Weierstrass equation is written as
E : Y 2 = X3 + a4XZ
4 + a6Z
6
In this system, (x, y) is replaced with any triple (X, Y, Z) = (xλ2, yλ3, λ)
where λ ∈ K∗. From a triple (X, Y, Z), the affine coordinates can be written
as Affine(X, Y, Z) = (x = X/Z2, y = Y/Z3). The negative of −(X : Y : Z)
is (X : −Y : Z) while the identity element O corresponds to (1, 1, 0). If
points P = (X1, Y1, Z1) and Q = (X2, Y2, Z2) correspond to affine points
(X1/Z
2
1 , Y1/Z
3
1) and (X2/Z
2
2 , Y2/Z
3
2) respectively, P 6= ±Q, P 6= O, Q 6= O,
and P 6= ±Q, then the point P + Q = (X3, Y3, Z3) can be computed as
follows:
Setting A = X1Z
2
1 ,
B = X2Z
2
1 ,
C = Y1Z
3
2 ,
D = Y2Z
3
1 and
E = (B − A), F = (D − C)
we can write X3 = −E3 − 2AE2 + F 2,
Y3 = −CE3 + F (AE2 −X3) and
Z3 = Z1Z2E
Similarly, if 2P = (X3, : Y3, Z3), we can compute 2P as follows:
Setting A = 4X1Y
2
1 and
B = 3X21 + a4Z
4
1
we can write X3 = −2A+B2
Y3 = −8Y 41 +B(A−X3)
Z3 = 2Y1Z1
Addition requires (12M + 4S) operations and doubling requires (4M + 6S)
operations.
Other derivatives of projective coordinate systems are Chudnovsky Jacobian
coordinates and Modified Jacobian coordinates. In Chudnovsky Jacobian
coordinates, an affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3) is represented as a quintuple
(X, Y, Z, Z2, Z3). Point Addition requires (11M + 3S) operations and point
doubling requires (5M + 6S) operations and this representation ensures
faster addition and doubling when compared to Projective coordinate point
representation. In Modified Jacobian coordinates, an affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3)
is represented as (X, Y, Z, a4Z
4) The operation counts for modified Jacobian
co-ordinates are (13M + 6S) for point addition and (4M + 4S) for point
doubling.
Until now, in this chapter, we looked at some formulae for point arithmetic
on the Weierstrass curve. We will return to other formulae for Weierstrass
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curves in Section 2.6.2 of this chapter and then in Chapter 5. We now turn
to other forms of elliptic curves.
2.2 Montgomery Curves
In a landmark paper [80], an elliptic curve of the form
Em : By
2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
was introduced by Peter Montgomery. Over a field K where char(K) 6= 2,
curve parameters A, (B 6= 0) for Em satisfy A, B ∈ K, and B(A2 − 4) 6= 0.
A Montgomery curve over K can be written in Weierstrass form, whilst it is
not always possible for a Weierstrass curve to be written in Montgomery form
as the order of a Montgomery curve is divisible by 4. The Weierstrass curve
y2 = x3 + a4x+ a6 over K can be written in Montgomery form if and only if
the polynomial x3 + a4x+ a6 has a root xp in K and (3x
2
p + a4) is a square
in K [28]. If P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) are points on Em and x1 6= x2,
then the x-coordinate of P + Q = (x3, y3) can be computed (provided the
x-coordinate of P −Q = (x4, y4) is known) as follows:
x3 =
1
x4
.
(x2x1 − 1)2
(x1 − x2)2 , which requires (1I + 2M + 2S) operations.
The inverse operation can be avoided if projective coordinates are used.
We provide further details in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The formulae for
Montgomery curves are different to those of Weierstrass curves, in the sense
that, x coordinates suffice for point arithmetic (x-coordinate only arithmetic).
It is attractive due to its low operation count and lower memory requirement.
However, the difference of the two points being added should be known in
advance. The x-coordinate only formulae can be generalized to certain other
forms of elliptic curves[18]. We provide a list of such generalizations in Sec
3.3 of this thesis.
2.3 Edwards Curves
In 2007, Edwards [44] introduced a new form of an elliptic curve, now known as
Edwards curves. An Edwards curve, defined over a field K where char(K) 6= 2,
is given by the following equation [11]
EE : x
2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, where d ∈ K \ {0, 1}
If P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) are two point on EE, then P +Q = (x3, y3)
is given by
x3 =
x1y2 + y1x2
1 + dx1x2y1y2
and y3 =
y1y2 − x1x2
1− dx1x2y1y2
The formulae for doubling and tripling are as follows:
If 2P = (x3, y3), then x3 =
2x1y1
x21 + y
2
1
and y3 =
y21 − x21
2− (x21 + y21)
If 3P = (x4, y4), then x4 =
(x21 + y
2
1)
2 − (2y1)2
4(x21 − 1)x21 − (x21 − y21)2
and y4 =
(x21 + y
2
1)
2 − (2x1)2
−4(y21 − 1)y21 + (x21 − y21)2
The group operation on an Edwards’ curve(a plane quartic) is not defined
using the chord-tangent construction given earlier in section 1.3. A proof of
the group law on an Edwards curve is given in [12]. Not all elliptic curves
can be written in Edwards form over K, as an Edwards curve always has
points of order 4, see [12]. To avoid computing inverses, the equation for
EE could be homogenized and then transformed [12] to a curve of the form
(X2+Y 2)Z2 = c2(Z4+dX2Y 2) such that c, d ∈ K \{0, 1} and dc4 6= 1. Using
projective coordinates, on an Edwards curve,
Addition requires (10M + 1S) operations
Doubling requires (3M + 4S) operations
Tripling requires (9M + 4S) operations
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Using an efficient (computationally) birational equivalence from the Edwards
form to the Montgomery form [23], the operation count for doubling on a
Montgomery form elliptic curve can be reduced from (2M + 2S + 1Mc) to
(1M + 3S + 3Mc) when the curve parameter d is a square in K. While not
all Montgomery curves can be written in Edwards form, every Montgomery
curve can be written in a generalized form of Edwards curves called twisted
Edwards curves (a curve of the form ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 over a field K
where non zero elements a, d ∈ K and char(K) 6= 2) [10].
2.4 Huff’s Model
Another model of the elliptic curve introduced by Huff in 1948 has been
adapted for use in cryptography [57]. An elliptic curve in Huff’s form (defined
over a field k) is given by
EH : aX(Y
2 −X2) = bY (X2 − Z2) where a2 6= b2
If P1 = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) and P2 = (X2 : Y2 : Z2) are two points on EH and
P3 = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) = P1 + P2 then
X3 = (X1Z2 +X2Z1)(Y1Y2 + Z1Z2)
2(Z1Z2 −X1X2)
Y3 = (Y1Z2 + Y2Z1)(X1X2 + Z1Z2)
2(Z1Z2 − Y1Y2)
Z3 = (Z
2
1Z
2
2 −X21X22 )(Z21Z22 − Y 21 Y 22 )
The above computation of addition on an Huff’s elliptic curve can be achieved
by an algorithm costing 12M . The same formulae can be used for doubling
as well and can be performed in (7M + 5S). When S > 0.75M , a dedicated
doubling algorithm costing (10M + 1S) was presented in [57].
2.5 Selmer Curves
In [110], the authors consider a new model of an elliptic curve called Selmer
Curves that was so named by Ian Connell [30]. The authors in [110] also
provide explicit point addition and doubling formulae for Selmer curves.
Following [30], we provide the following definition.
A Selmer curve over K is defined by an equation of the form
ax3 + by3 = c
where a, b, c ∈ K and abc 6= 0. Along with point arithmetic formulae, we will
further look at Selmer curves in the context of pairings in Chapter 6.
The costs for point addition and doubling for various coordinate systems/curve
forms reviewed in this chapter until now can be summarized as below:
Table 2.1: Point Addition and Doubling Summary
Coordinate system/
Elliptic curve form
Addition Doubling
Affine 1I + 2M + 1S 1I + 2M + 2S
Projective 12M + 2S 7M + 5S
Jacobian 12M + 4S 4M + 6S
Chudnovsky 11M + 3S 5M + 6S
Modified Jacobian 13M + 6S 4M + 4S
Edwards Curve 10M + 1S 3M + 4S
Huff’s Curve 12M 7M + 5S
2.6 Scalar Multiplication
One of the most important aspects of elliptic curve cryptography is that of
Scalar multiplication. This is the quantity nP , where n is an integer and P
is a point on an Elliptic curve defined over a finite field. The quantity nP is
given by
[n]p = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n-1) point additions
and consumes a significant amount of time in typical elliptic curve
cryptographic schemes and thus has received attention in terms of
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implementing elliptic curve cryptosystems. Efficient implementation of
elliptic curve cryptography is dependent on the following:
(i) scalar multiplication technique
(ii) point arithmetic formulae and
(iii) field arithmetic.
This hierarchy can be visualized as below:
Underlying Finite Field Arithmetic
Point Arithmetic Formulae
Scalar multiplication
Cryptographic Protocols
The techniques used in different layers of the hierarchy depicted above are
not independent of each other. In this chapter, we have looked at point
arithmetic formulae. The scalar multiplication technique used in a particular
implementation can influence the choice of point arithmetic formuale used.
When the scalar n is fixed, the scalar multiplication technique focuses on
an addition chain (see Section 4.1) for n. When the point P is fixed,
Yao’s method [109] can be used, where precomputations are of primary
importance. In a more generic setting, the well known Double-and-Add
algorithm which is analogous to the square-and-multiply method can be
used to compute nP using l doublings and about m additions where l is the
bit length of n and m is the hamming weight of n. The Double-and-Add
algorithm produces an addition chain for n. The Double-and-Add
algorithm is also known as the binary method in the literature and can be
generalized to an m-ary method. The 2s-ary method breaks up the binary
representation of n into window lengths of s and a sliding window algorithm
that makes use of suitable precomputed values can be utilized to compute nP .
One of the techniques of computing a scalar multiplication when n is fixed is
to write n in the Double Base Number System format as depicted below.
2.6.1 Double Base Number System
The Double Base Number System (DBNS) introduced initially by Dimitrov
and Cooklev in [40] was utilized later in the context of elliptic curves in [41].
With this system, the scalar n is written as
n =
l∑
i=1
si2
ai3bi or n =
l∑
i=1
si2
ai5bi where si = ±1 .
The above idea can be generalized to a triple base number system where an
integer n is represented as
n =
l∑
i=1
si2
ai3bi5ci where si = ±1.
Double and Triple base number system representations, though very short,
are not immediately suitable for use in scalar multiplication algorithms.
However, if we could somehow ensure that the three exponents are all
simultaneously decreasing, i.e., a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . . al and b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . bl
and c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . cl, then using Horner’s rule, a scalar multiplication
algorithm can be developed to compute nP . The simultaneously decreasing
exponents can be computed using greedy algorithms. An example of such
a greedy algorithm was provided by Mishra and Dimitrov in [79, Algorithm 1].
From the double, triple and quintuple base representations of a scalar k
with simultaneously decreasing exponents as depicted above, it is clear that
in addition to fast point addition and doubling, fast point tripling and
quintupling algorithms are highly desirable, as this would speed up the
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computation of nP when the DBNS is employed. Thus, there has been a
keen interest in obtaining faster point tripling and quintupling algorithms
amongst researchers.
2.6.2 Quintupling Formulae for Weierstrass Curves
In [79] the authors provide a fast quintupling algorithm for Affine coordinates
on binary Weierstrass curves. In the same paper, the authors also propose
a fast quintupling algorithm in Affine and Projective Jacobian coordinates
for Weierstrass curves over Fp. In Jacobian coordinates, the cost of the
quintupling algorithm provided in [79] is (15M + 10S). Another algorithm
costing (7M + 16S) was provided by Giorgi et al in [49]. The authors in
[79] take into account the multiplication by the curve parameter a while
computing the cost of their algorithm, whereas the authors in [49] do not take
into account the multiplication by the curve parameter a while computing
the costs of their algorithm. Thus for comparison purposes we can take
the cost of the algorithm in [49] to be (8M + 16S). In [74], Longa and
Miri provide a quintupling algorithm (Jacobian coordinates, Weierstrass
curve over Fp) with costs equal to (10M + 14S). When the curve parameter
a = −3, Mishra’s algorithm in [79] costs (15M + 8S), Giorgi’s algorithm in
[49] costs (7M + 16S) and Longa’s algorithm in [74] costs (11M + 11S). Thus
while Longa’s algorithm in [74] performs better than Mishra’s algorithm in
[79], Giorgi’s algorithm in [49] is the best option.
Giorgi’s 8M + 16S point quintupling algorithm in [49] was derived using
an automaton implementing a directed acyclic graph structure looking for
common subexpressions in the formulae and executing several arithmetic
transformations. However using the simple transformation
2XY = (X + Y )2 −X2 − Y 2 (2.1)
we show that the complexity of Mishra’s algorithm can be reduced to that of
Giorgi’s algorithm, as shown below.
Mishra and Dimitrov’s Algorithm for Quintupling on Weierstrass
Curves
We recall the equation for Weierstrass curve over a prime field K given by
Hw(K) : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b
where a, b ∈ K, 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 and the point P = (X : Y : Z) corresponds to
the point (X/Z2, Y/Z3) in Jacobian coordinates. Given that P is a point on
Hw and if 5P = 5(X : Y : Z) = (X5, Y5, Z5), Mishra and Dimitrov, using
Division Polynomials, provide the following formulae in [79] to compute
X5, Y5 and Z5.
X5 = XV
2 − 2Y UW,
Y5 = Y (E
3(12V L2 − V 2 − 16L4)− 64TL5) and
Z5 = ZV
where
T = 8Y 4; (Cost = 2S),
M = 3X2 + aZ4; (Cost = 3S + 1M),
E = 12XY 2 −M2; (Cost = 1S + 1M),
2L = 2ME − 2T ; (Cost = 1M),
U = 4Y L; (Cost = 1M),
V = 4TL− E3; (Cost = 1S + 2M),
N = V − 4L2; (Cost = 1S),
2W = 2EN ; (Cost = 1M),
X5 = 4(X.V
2 − 2Y.U.W ); (Cost = 3M + 1S),
Y5 = 8Y.[E
3.(12V.L2 − V 2
− 16(L2)2)− 64(TL.(L2)2)]; (Cost = 4M + 1S)
and Z5 = 2Z.V ; (Cost = 1M).
Thus the total cost of computing the Quintupling formulae is (15M + 10S).
Now using equation(2.1), 12XY 2, 4Y L, 12V.L2, ME and ZV can be
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computed as
12X.Y 2 = 6[(X + Y 2)2 −X2 − Y 4]; (Cost = 1S traded for 1M),
4Y L = 2[(Y + L)2 − Y 2 − L2]; (Cost = 1S traded for 1M),
12V.L2 = 6[(V + L2)− V 2 − L4]; (Cost = 1S traded for 1M),
2ME = [(M + E)2 −M2 − E2]; (Cost = 1S traded for 1M) and
2ZV = [(Z + V )2 − Z2 − V 2]; (Cost = 1S traded for 1M) .
Thus the cost of the Mishra and Dimitrov Quintupling algorithm
can be reduced from 15M + 10S to 10M + 15S. It turns
out that one multiplication can further be eliminated from the
Mishra and Dimitrov Algorithm. Indeed, in the computation of
X5, Y UW is computed where U = 4Y L and thus Y UW = 4Y
2LW .
Thus we could alter U to be equal to 4Y 2L instead of 4Y L. Now, we could
write 4Y 2L as
U = 4Y 2L = 2[(Y 2 + L)2 − Y 4 − L2]; and thus
X5 = 4(XV
2 − 2UW ); (New Cost = 2M + 1S) .
Thus the cost of the modified Mishra and Dimitrov Algorithm can be reduced
to 9M + 15S which is just slightly better than the 10M + 14S cost of the
Longa and Miri Quintupling Algorithm. Further we could compute N2 as
N2 = (V − 4L2)2 = V 2 + 16L4 − 8V L2 .
Now N2 could be computed without using any extra squarings or
multiplications, as V 2, L4 and V L2 are computed for other steps in the
algorithm, as shown above. Thus 2W = 2EN could be computed as
2W = [(E +N)2 − E2 −N2] .
Now, E2 is also computed in another step in the algorithm, thus effectively
replacing 1M with a 1S. Thus, we have reduced the cost of the modified
Mishra and Dimitrov algorithm to 8M + 16S using equation (2.1).
The costs for point quintupling on Jacobian coordinates can be summarized
as below:
Table 2.2: Jacobian Coordinates Quintupling
Algorithm
a need not be equal
to −3 a = −3
Mishra and Dimitrov [79] 15M + 10S 15M + 8S
Giorgi [49] 8M + 16S 7M + 16S
Longa and Miri [74] 10M + 14S 11M + 11S
Modified Mishra and Dimitrov [98] 8M + 16S
2.6.3 Quintupling Formulae for Edwards Curves
Revisited
In [11], Bernstein et al, amongst other things, provide two fast algorithms
for point quintupling on Edwards curves defined over Fp. As in Section 2.3,
an Edwards curve Ed defined over a field K is given by x
2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
where d ∈ K\{0, 1}.
The two quintupling algorithms provided in [11], (we call them Algorithm
A and Algorithm B for convenience) cost (17M + 7S) and (14M + 11S)
respectively. The authors in [11] conclude that Algorithm A performs
better if the S/M ratio i.e., S/M > 0.75 while Algorithm B performs
better if S/M < 0.75. When S/M = 0.75, both algorithms share the same
complexity. Here we modify Algorithm B slightly to provide an alternate
algorithm (Algorithm C). If the affine point (X1/Z1, Y1/Z1) represents the
point (X1, Y1, Z1) on the homogenized equation of Ed, and if (X5, Y5, Z5) =
5(X1, Y1, Z1), the new quintupling algorithm (Algorithm C) is as below:
A = X21 ; B = Y
2
1 ; C = Z
2
1 ; D = A + B; E = 2C − D; F = A2;
G = B2; H = F + G; I = D2 − H; J = E2; K = G − F ; L = K2;
M = 2I.J ; N = L + M ; O = L −M ; P = N.O; Q = (E + K)2 − J − L;
R = 2(2JH − L); S = Q.R; T = 4Q.O.(D − C); U = R.N ; V = U + T ;
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W = U −T ; X5 = 2X1.(P +B.S).W ; Y5 = 2Y1.(P −A.S).V ; Z5 = Z1.V.W
Algorithm A and Algorithm B were verified by the authors in [11]. The
only difference between Algorithm C above and Algorithm B in [11] is in the
computation of R. In [11], R was computed as
R = ((D + E)2 − J −H − I)2 − 2N
In Algorithm C we employ R = 2(2JH − L), as we can rewrite R as follows:
R = ((D + E)2 − J −H − I)2 − 2N
=
{[
(X21 + Y
2
1 ) + (2Z
2
1 − (X21 + Y 21 )
]2
− [2Z21 − (X21 + Y 21 )]2 − [X41 + Y 41 ]− 2X21Y 21 }2 − 2N
=
[
2(X21 + Y
2
1 )(2Z
2
1 − (X21 + Y 21 ))
]2
− 2[(Y 41 −X41 )2 + 4(X21Y 21 ){2Z21 − (X21 + Y 21 )}2]
= 4
[
2Z21 − (X21 + Y 21 )
]2{
X41 + Y
4
1
}− 2[(Y 41 −X41 )2]
= 4JH − 2L
= 2(2JH − L)
Algorithm C above for quintupling costs (15M + 9S) and is better than both
the quintupling algorithms provided in [11] as long as M > S and M < 2S
and irrespective of whether S/M < 0.75 or S/M > 0.75.
Table 2.3: Edwards Curve Quintupling Formulae Summary
Algorithm Quintupling Costs
Algorithm A [11] 17M + 7S
Algorithm B [11] 14M + 11S
Algorithm C [98] 15M + 9S
2.7 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks are a group of techniques using which an adversary can
obtain the key (or a part of the key) by using information related to power
consumption, time taken for a cryptographic operation, electromagnetic
radiation etc [18, 31, 48, 85]. For example, if kP were computed where k is
a scalar and also a secret with P being an Elliptic curve point, and if the
double-and-add algorithm were to be used for scalar multiplication, then it is
possible to deduce information about the key from a power/timing analysis
corresponding to the computation of kP as there is a difference between the
point doubling and point addition operations. A countermeasure to this type
of attack is the double-and-always-add algorithm of Coron [31]. Another
counter measure is the Montgomery Ladder which ensures that there is no
relation between the Hamming weight of the secret k and the execution time
of the algorithm. Implementing an Atomic Block is one way to overcome
side channel attacks. Atomic blocks consist of structuring various point
arithmetic operations using a homogeneous sequence of operations. An
introduction to atomic blocks can be found in [28, Chapter 29].
From the previous sections of this chapter, it may appear that we should
always look for algorithms with the least operation count cost. However
there are circumstances where the most cost-effective option is not always
the best option in every situation, especially so when it comes to overcoming
side channel attacks. For example, in [1], Abarzua and Theriault, while
designing side-channel resistant atomic blocks for Weierstrass elliptic curves
in Jacobian Coordinates over prime fields, use a (9M + 7S) point tripling
formulae due to Dimitirov, Imbert and Mishra [41], as the more economical
(7M + 7S) tripling algorithm due to Longa and Miri [73] could not fit nicely
into their atomic block pattern. Thus, there may be a trade-off between
efficiency and security, as the most efficient algorithm may not lend itself to
side-channel resistant methods.
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Chapter 3
Differential Arithmetic on
Elliptic Curves
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we introduced x − coordinate only formulae
for Montgomery curves with the points in affine representation. This x −
coordinate only arithmetic is usually known as differential arithmetic. In
some cases, y − coordinate only arithmetic or w − coordinate arithmetic are
used and such formulae are also known as differential arithmetic formuale.
We first provide Projective coordinate formulae for Montgomery curves and
then provide x− coordinate only tripling formulae for Montgomery curves.
We then speed up differential addition formulae for Generalised Edwards
coordinates and Binary Edwards curves.
3.1 Introduction to Differential Arithmetic
The projective form of the Montgomery curve defined over a finite field Fp
can be written as
Em : BY
2Z = X3 + AX2Z +XZ2 where A,B ∈ Fp and A 6= ±2, B 6= 0
Let P = (X1, Y1, Z1) and nP = (Xn, Yn, Zn). We know that the set of points
on Em form an Abelian group and the identity element (0,1,0) in this group
is denoted as O. The sum (n+m)P = nP +mP can be computed using the
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formulae below:
Addition: (n 6= m):
Xm+n = Zm−n((Xm − Zm)(Xn + Zn) + (Xm + Zm)(Xn − Zn))2
Zm+n = Xm−n((Xm − Zm)(Xn + Zn)− (Xm + Zm)(Xn − Zn))2
Doubling: (n = m):
X2n = (Xn + Zn)
2(Xn − Zn)2
4XnZn = (Xn + Zn)
2 − (Xn − Zn)2
Z2n = 4XnZn((Xn − Zn)2 + ((A+ 2)/4)(4XnZn))
= 4XnZn((Xn + Zn)
2 + ((A− 2)/4)(4XnZn))
Point addition requires 4M + 2S operations and a point doubling requires
3M + 2S operations. If Zm−n = 1, then point addition requires 3M + 2S
operations. The well known Montgomery ladder that can be used to compute
nP is as below:
Algorithm 3.1: Left-to-Right Montgomery ladder for scalar multiplication
INPUT: A point P on Em and a positive integer n = (nt . . . n0)2 with nt = 1
OUTPUT: The point nP
P1 ← P and P2 ← 2P
for i = t− 1 down to 0 do
if ni = 0 then
P2 ← P2 + P1 (P); P1 ← 2P1
else
P1 ← P2 + P1 (P); P2 ← 2P2
end if
end for
return P1
In all algorithms in this thesis, whenever the difference between two points is
required to compute the sum of those points, the difference is indicated in
brackets immediately after the addition formula. In Algorithm 3.1, we have
P1 ← P2 + P1 (P ) (3.1)
The notation in equation (3.1) means that when P2 is added to P1 and the
result is stored in P1 the difference required between these two points is P
i.e., P2 − P1 = P . Clearly, the above algorithm is a Left-to-Right algorithm.
If (nt . . . n1n0)2 is the binary representation of n and (nt = 1), to compute
[n]P , we proceed as follows: we hold {miP, (mi + 1)P} for mi = (nt . . . ni)2.
If ni = 0,miP = 2mi+1P and (mi + 1)P = (mi+1 + 1)P + mi+1P else
miP = (mi+1 + 1)P + mi+1P and (mi + 1)P = 2(mi+1 + 1)P . Beginning
from {P, 2P}, Algorithm 3.1 computes {nP, (n+ 1)P}.
Until now, in this chapter, we have had a look at x-coordinate only point
addition and doubling formulae. We proceed to look at x-coordinate only
tripling formulae for Montgomery curves.
3.2 Differential Tripling Formulae for
Montgomery Curves
Let P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1), P2 = (X2, Y2, Z2) and P3 = (X3, Y3, Z3) be points on a
Montgomery curve Em with P2 = 2P1 and P3 = 3P1. Then the tripling can
be computed as
X3 = X1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2Z1)2)2 and
Z3 = Z1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2X1)2)2 .
The above tripling formulae require 6M + 5S operations. As the Tripling
formulae is x-coordinate only formulae, we use the term Differential Tripling
to distinguish the new formulae from usual tripling formulae where both x
and y coordinates are computed.
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We derive the above differential point tripling formulae for Montgomery
curves. Let P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1), P2 = (X2, Y2, Z2) and P3 = (X3, Y3, Z3) be
points on a Montgomery curve Em with P2 = 2P1 andP3 = 3P1. We can
write P3 = 3P1 = 2P1 + P1 = P2 + P1. Then
X2 = (X1 + Z1)
2(X1 − Z1)2 (3.2)
Z2 = 4X1Z1((X1 − Z1)2 + ((A+ 2)/4)(4X1Z1)) (3.3)
X3 = Z1[(X1 − Z1)(X2 + Z2) + (X1 + Z1)(X2 − Z2)]2 (3.4)
Z3 = X1[(X1 − Z1)(X2 + Z2)− (X1 + Z1)(X2 − Z2)]2 (3.5)
From equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) we can write
X3 =Z1
[
(X1 − Z1){
(X1 + Z1)
2 (X1 − Z1)2 + 4X1Z1 (X1 − Z1)2 + ((A+ 2) /4) (4X1Z1)2
}
+ (X1 + Z1){
(X1 + Z1)
2 (X1 − Z1)2 − 4X1Z1 (X1 − Z1)2 − ((A+ 2) /4) (4X1Z1)2
}]2
= Z1
[(
(X1 + Z1) (X1 − Z1)
)2{
2X1
}− 4X1Z1 (X1 − Z1)2 {2Z1}
− ((A+ 2)/4)(4X1Z1)2{2Z1}]2
= 4X21Z1
[(
(X1 + Z1) (X1 − Z1)
)2 − 4Z21 (X1 − Z1)2
− ((A+ 2) /4) (16X1Z31)]2
= 4X21Z1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2Z1)2)2
Similarly,
Z3 =X1
[
(X1 − Z1){
(X1 + Z1)
2 (X1 − Z1)2 + 4X1Z1 (X1 − Z1)2 + ((A+ 2) /4) (4X1Z1)2
}
− (X1 + Z1){
(X1 + Z1)
2 (X1 − Z1)2 − 4X1Z1 (X1 − Z1)2 − ((A+ 2) /4) (4X1Z1)2
}]2
= X1
[(
(X1 + Z1) (X1 − Z1)
)2{−2Z1}− 4X1Z1 (X1 − Z1)2 {2X1}
− ((A+ 2)/4)(4X1Z1)2{2X1}]2
= 4X1Z
2
1
[−((X1 + Z1) (X1 − Z1))2 + 4X21 (X1 − Z1)2
+
(
(A+ 2) /4
) (
16X31Z1
)]2
= 4X1Z
2
1
(− (X21 − Z21)2 + (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2X1)2)2
= 4X1Z
2
1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2X1)2)2
Dividing both X3 and Z3 by 4X1Z1 we get, when (X1, Y1) 6= (0, 0)
X3 = X1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2Z1)2)2
Z3 = Z1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2X1)2)2
The formulae for X3 and Y3 derived above can be computed using the
following 6M + 5S algorithm:
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T1 ← X1; T2 ← Z1
T1 ← T 21 (= X21 )
T2 ← T 22 (= Z21)
T3 ← (T1 − T2)2 (= (X21 − Z21)2)
T4 ← X1Z1 (= X1Z1)
T4 ← A.T4 (= AX1Z1)
T5 ← T2 + T2 + T2 + T2 (= 4Z21)
T6 ← T1 + T1 + T1 + T1 (= 4X21 )
T4 ← T1 + T2 + T4 (= X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1)
T7 ← T4.T5 (= (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1)(4Z21))
T8 ← T4.T6 (= (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1)(4X21 ))
T1 ← (T3 − T7)2
(
=
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2Z1)2)2)
T2 ← (T3 − T8)2
(
=
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2X1)2)2)
X3 ← X1.T1
(
= X1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2Z1)2)2)
Z3 ← Z1.T2
(
= Z1
((
X21 − Z21
)2 − (X21 + Z21 + AX1Z1) (2X1)2)2)
If P3 is computed as 2P1 + P1 (i.e.,using a point doubling followed by a point
addition), we need (4M + 2S) + (3M + 2S) = 7M + 4S, while the number of
field additions/subtractions required are the same in both the cases (using
either the differential tripling formula or using P3 = 2P1 + P1). Thus the
above tripling formulae are efficient as (6M + 5S) < (7M + 4S). When
Z1 = 1 the above tripling formulae only needs (3M + 4S) operations whereas,
if 3P were to be computed as 2P + P , (that is, a doubling followed by an
addition with Z1 = 1), then (3M + 2S) + (3M + 2S) = (6M + 4S) operations
would be required thus resulting in a saving of 3M . The differential tripling
formulae cannot be readily used in the binary Montgomery Ladder. However
in the next chapter, we describe situations in which the tripling formuale can
be utilized.
3.3 Differential Arithmetic Generalized
The point addition and doubling formulae for Montgomery curves provided
in Section 3.1 were the first differential addition formulae published in the
literature. The idea of differential addition has since been extended to other
forms of elliptic curves such as
• Lopez and Dahab’s extension [75] to Weierstrass curves over F2m.
• Two independently developed extensions to Weierstrass curves over Fp
- one due to Fisher, Giraud, Knudsen and Seifert[48]
and
- the other due to Brier and Joye [18].
• Bernstein, Lange and Farashahi’s [13] extension to Binary Edwards
curves.
• Justus and Loebenberger’s extension [58] to Generalized Edwards curves
over Fq (char(Fq) 6= 2).
• Farashahi and Joye’s extension [47] to Generalized Binary Hessian
curves.
• Devigne and Joye’s extension [38] to Binary Huff curves.
• Hutter, Joye and Sierra’s [52] extension to Weierstrass curves over Fp
in homogeneous projective coordinates where the points to be added
share the same Z-coordinate.
• Wu, Tang and Feng’s [108] extension to a new model of Binary Edwards
curves.
The Montgomery ladder for scalar multiplication that was initially proposed
and utilized for Montgomery curves can be adapted to the examples listed
above. Differential addition formulae have been published for the examples
above. For instance, [28, Section 13.3.4] provides the differential addition
formulae for Binary Weistrass’ curves. However, the addition formula is
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correct only when Zm−n = 1. The text does not mention this. If Zm−n 6= 1,
then the formulae in [28, Section 13.3.4] should read as follows:
Zm+n = Zm−n
[
XmZn +XnZm
]2
Xm+n = Xm−n
[
XmXn +XnZm
]2
+ Zm−n(XmZn)(XnZm)
Thus addition should take 6M + 1S operations; When Zm−n = 1, this would
reduce to 4M + 1S.
3.3.1 Differential Arithmetic on Generalized Edwards’
Curves revisited
In Section 3.3.2, we try to speed up some of the formulae proposed in [58]
and the affine w-Coordinate differential addition proposed in [108]. In
the remainder of this section, we review some of the differential addition
formulae for Generalized Edwards curves as provided in [58] and the affine
w-Coordinate differential addition formulae for a new model of Binary elliptic
curve as provided in [108].
Generalized Edwards curves over a finite field Fp are given by (curve
parameters c, d ∈ Fp)
Ec,d : x
2 + y2 = c2(1 + dx2y2)
It turns out that the differential addition formulae for generalized Edwards
curves use y-only coordinates instead of x-only coordinates for Montgomery
curves. Let P = (x1, y1) be a point on Ec,d. In projective coordinates, P can
be written as P = (X1, Y1, Z1) we write nP = (Xn : Yn : Zn). If c, d 6= 0,
dc4 6= 1 and d is not a square in GF (p), the sum (n+m)P = nP +mP , as
provided in [58], is reproduced below:
A. Differential Addition for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
(m > n)
(Operation count given by authors in [58] is 6M + 4S).
Ym+n = Zm−n(Y 2m(Z
2
n − c2dY 2n ) + Z2m(Y 2n − c2Z2n))
Zm+n = Ym−n(dY 2m(Y
2
n − c2Z2n) + Z2m(Z2n − c2dY 2n ))
B. Differential Doubling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
(n = m)
(Operation count given by authors in [58] is 1M + 4S).
Y2n = −c2dY 4n + 2Y 2nZ2n − c2Z4n
Z2n = dY
4
n − 2c2dY 2nZ2n + Z4n
In [58], point tripling formula are provided as well. We reproduce them below:
C. Tripling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
(Operation count given by authors in [58] is 4M + 7S).
Y3n = Yn(c
2(3Z4n − dY 4n )2−
Z4n(8c
2Z4n + (Y
2
n (c
3d+ c−1)− 2cZ2n)2−
c−2(c4d+ 1)2Y 4n ))
Z3n = Zn(c
2(Z4n − 3dY 4n )2+
dY 4n (4c
2Z4n − (Y 2n (c3d+ c−1)− 2cZ2n)2+
c−2((c4d+ 1)2 − 12c4d)2Y 4n ))
In [58], an alternate parameterization is provided by the authors, where
only the squares of the points (Ym : Zm), (Yn : Zn) and (Ym−n : Zm−n) are
utilized. We call this Squares Only or SQO parametrization. The authors
provide addition, doubling and tripling formulae for this parametrization.
Here we reproduce the doubling and the tripling formulae from [58] for SQO
parametrization.
53
D. SQO Doubling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates: n = m
(Operation count given in [58] is 5S).
Y 22n = ((1− c2d)Y 4n + (1− c2)Z4n − (Y 2n − Z2n)2)2
Z22n = (dc
2(Y 2n − Z2n)2 − d(c2 − 1)Y 4n + (c2d− 1)Z4n)2
E. SQO Tripling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates: m = 2n
(Operation count in [58] is 4M + 7S).
Y 23n = Y
2
n (c
2(3Z4n − dY 4n )2−
Z4n(8c
2Z4n + (Y
2
n (c
3d+ c−1)− 2cZ2n)2−
c−2(c4d+ 1)2Y 4n ))
2
Z23n = Z
2
n(c
2(Z4n − 3dY 4n )2+
dY 4n (4c
2Z4n − (Y 2n (c3d+ c−1)− 2cZ2n)2+
c−2((c4d+ 1)2 − 12c4d)Y 4n ))2
In [108], the authors propose a new model of Binary Edwards curve given by
St : x
2y + xy2 + txy + x+ y = 0
where (x, y) ∈ K2 and K is a field of char 2. Further, in section 6 of
their paper, the authors construct differential addition formula for St. We
reproduce the approach and the formulae here.
F. Affine w-coordinate Differential Addition and Doubling for a
new model of Binary Edwards Curves proposed in [108]:
(Operation count for addition and doubling as given in [108] is
1I + 2M + 2S + 1Mc and 1I + 1M + 2S + 1Mc respectively.)
Utilizing the idea of w-coordinate differential addition that was initially
proposed by the authors in [13] for Binary Edwards curves, the authors in
[108] propose w-coordinate differential addition and doubling for the elliptic
curve St, i.e., they present formulae to compute w(P +Q) and w(2P ) from
w(P ), w(Q) and w(Q−P ). If P = (x, y) is a point on St, then the w-function
is defined as w(P ) = xy. If P = (x2, y2), Q = (x3, y3), Q − P = (x1, y1),
2P = (x4, y4) and Q + P = (x5, y5), we write wi = xiyi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Then w2 = w(P ), w4 = w(2P ), w5 = w(P + Q), w1 = w(Q − P ) and
w3 = w(Q). The affine differential addition formulae on St, as developed and
presented in [108] are as follows:
w4 =
1 + w42
t2w22
and w5 = w1 +
t2w2w3
w22 + w
2
3
The efficiency of arithmetic in characteristic 2 fields is significantly different
compared to fields of odd characteristic. For instance, in binary fields, squaring
is much faster than multiplication and has a complexity similar to that of
modular addition [106].
3.3.2 Alternate Algorithms and Newer Operation
Counts
In this section, recalling results from [97], we show that the operation counts
in formulae (B-F) of Section 3.3.1 can be improved. For clarity in comparison,
the subsections that describe and compare our improvements to (B-F) of
Section 3.3.1 are labeled as (BB-FF) respectively.
BB. Differential Doubling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
The operation count of formula (B) in Section 3.3.1 is 1M +4S as the formula
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can be computed using the following algorithm:
A← Y 2n ( = Y 2n ) S
B ← Z2n ( = Z2n) S
D ← A ∗B ( = Y 2nZ2n) M
A← A2 ( = Y 4n ) S
B ← B2 ( = Z4n) S
Y2n = −c2dA+ ( = −c2dY 4n+ 2Mc
2D − c2B 2Y 2nZ2n − c2Z4n)
Z2n = dA− 2c2dD +B ( = dY 4n− 2Mc
2c2dY 2nZ
2
n + Z
4
n)
Thus the total complexity, if one takes into consideration the cost Mc of
multiplication by a constant other than 1 or 2 or 3, is (1M + 4Mc + 4S). The
formulae (B) in Section 3.3.1 can be rewritten as
Y2n = −c2dY 4n + 2Y 2nZ2n − c2Z4n = 2Y 2nZ2n − c2(Z4n + dY 4n )
Z2n = dY
4
n − 2c2dY 2nZ2n + Z4n = −c2d(2Y 2nZ2n) + (Z4n + dY 4n )
The rewritten formulae above can be computed using the algorithm below:
A← Y 2n ( = Y 2n ) S
B ← Z2n ( = Z2n) S
E ← A2 ( = Y 4n ) S
F ← B2 ( = Z4n) S
G← (A+B)2 ( = 2Y 2nZ2n) S
− E − F
Y2n = G− ( = 2Y 2nZ2n− 2Mc
c2(F + dE) c2(Z4n + dY
4
n ))
Z2n = (−c2d)G+ ( = −c2d(2Y 2nZ2n)+ 1Mc
(F + dE) (Z4n + dY
4
n ))
Thus the new complexity is 5S + 3Mc. As 1S < 1M , the new complexity
5S + 3Mc is less than the older complexity (1M + 4Mc + 4S)
CC. Tripling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
The operation count of formula (C) in Section 3.3.1 is 4M+7S. In addition to
this, by inspection, one can count 8Mc operations are required to compute the
requisite formula. Thus the total complexity of formula(C) is 4M + 7S+ 8Mc
From [58, Section 3.1], we have
y3 =
y(c2d2y8 − 6c2dy4 + 4(c4d+ 1)y2 − 3c2)
−3c2d2y8 + 4d(c4d+ 1)y6 − 6c2dy4 + c2 .
Writing y = Y/Z in projective coordinates, the above formula can be written
as
Y3n
Z3n
=
Yn
Zn
.
(c2d2Y 8n − 6c2dY 4nZ4n + 4(c4d+ 1)Y 2nZ6n − 3c2Z8n)
−3c2d2Y 8n + 4d(c4d+ 1)Y 6nZ2n − 6c2dY 4nZ4n + c2Z8n
.
Then
Y3n = Yn[c
2d2Y 8n − 6c2dY 4nZ4n + 4(c4d+ 1)Y 2nZ6n − 3c2Z8n]
and
Z3n = Zn[−3c2d2Y 8n + 4d(c4d+ 1)Y 6nZ2n − 6c2dY 4nZ4n + c2Z8n]
The above rewritten formulae can now be computed using the algorithm
57
below:
A← Y 2n ( = Y 2n ) S
B ← Z2n ( = Z2n) S
E ← A2 ( = Y 4n ) S
F ← B2 ( = Z4n) S
G← (A+B)2 (=(Y 2n + Z2n)2 S
− E − F − Y 4n − Z4n = 2Y 2nZ2n)
H ← G2 ( = 4Y 4nZ4n) S
J ← E2 ( = Y 8n ) S
K ← F 2 ( = Z8n) S
M ← (G+ F )2 [ = (2Y 2nZ2n + Z4n)2 − Z8n S
−K −H − 4Y 4nZ4n] = 4Y 2nZ6n
N ← (G+ E)2 [ = (2Y 2nZ2n + Y 4n )2 S
− J −H − Y 8n − 4Y 4nZ4n] = 4Y 6nZ2n
Finally,
Y3n ← Yn[(c2d2)J − (32c2d)H + (c2d+ 1)M − (3c2)K]
which costs 1M + 3Mc and
Z3n ← Zn[(−3c2d2)J − d(c4d+ 1)N − (32c2d)H + (c2)K]
which costs 1M + 2Mc. In the above, once (c
2)K is computed, the cost
of computing (3c2)K is ignored. The complexity of the new algorithm
is (10S + 2M + 5Mc). If 3S < 2M + 3Mc, then the new complexity of
(10S + 2M + 5Mc) is less than the older complexity of (7S + 4M + 8Mc). In
[8], 2M = 3S and thus 3S < 2M + 3Mc.
DD. SQO Doubling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
By inspecting formula(D) in Section 3.3.1 and taking into consideration that
we are provided with X22n and Y
2
2n, we can see that the total complexity of
the formula(D) is (5S+ 5Mc). We can improve upon this. Using the doubling
formula(BB) in this section, we can write
Y 22n =
[
2Y 2nZ
2
n − c2(Z4n + dY 4n )
]2
Z22n =
[− c2d(2Y 2nZ2n) + (Z4n + dY 4n )]2
Given that only squares of the coordinates are stored, the above formula can
be computed using the following algorithm:
A← (Y 2n )2 ( = Y 4n ) 1S
B ← (Z2n)2 ( = Z4n) 1S
E ← (Y 2n + Z2n)2 − A−B ( = 2Y 2nZ2n) 1S
Y 22n ←
[
E− ( = [2Y 2nZ2n 1S + 2Mc
c2(B + dA)
]2 − c2(Z4n + dY 4n )]2
Z22n ←
[− c2dE+ ( = [− c2d(2Y 2nZ2n) 1S +Mc
(B + dA)2
]2
+ (Z4n + dY
4
n )
]2
The complexity of the new algorithm is (5S + 3Mc) while the old complexity
was (5S + 5Mc)
EE. SQO Tripling for Generalised Edwards Coordinates:
By inspecting formula(E) in Section 3.3.1, we can see that the total complexity
of formula(E) is (4M + 7S + 8Mc). The algorithm used to compute Y3n and
Z3n in formula(CC) of this section can be adapted to compute the requisite
formulae. The first two steps can be omitted as squares are already available
and the last two steps can be replaced with
Y 23n ← Y 2n
[
(c2d2)J − (3
2
c2d)H + (c2d+ 1)M − (3c2)K]2
Z23n ← Z2n
[
(−3c2d2)J − d(c4d+ 1)N − (3
2
c2d)H + (c2)K
]2
The complexity of this algorithm is the same as that of formula(CC) which is
(10S + 2M + 5Mc). We can take 2M = 3S [8]. Thus 3S < (2M + 3Mc) and
the new algorithm with complexity (10S + 2M + 5Mc) is better than the old
algorithm with complexity (7S + 4M + 8Mc).
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The improvements for Generalized Edwards Coordinates can be summarized
in the table below:
Table 3.1: Differential Arithmetic on Generalized Edwards Coordinates
Point arithmetic on Generalized
Edwards coordinates
Previous [58] New [97]
Differential Doubling 1M + 4S + 4Mc 5S + 3Mc
Tripling 4M + 7S + 8Mc 2M + 10S + 5Mc
SQO Doubling 5S + 5Mc 5S + 3Mc
SQO Tripling 4M + 7S + 8Mc 2M + 10S + 5Mc
FF. Affine w-coordinate Differential Addition and Doubling for a
new model of Binary Edwards Curves proposed in [108]:
The operation count of computing w4 in formula (F) in Section 3.3.1 is
1I + 1M + 1Mc + 2S as the formula can be computed using the algorithm
below:
A = w22 ( = w
2
2) 1S
B = A2 ( = w42) 1S
C = t2A ( = t2w22) 1Mc
D = C−1
(
=
1
t2w22
)
1I
w4 = (1 +B)D
(
=
1 + w42
t2w22
)
1M
Now w4 can be rewritten as
w4 =
(
1
t2
)(
1
w22
+ w22
)
and
w4 can be computed using the following algorithm:
A = w22 ( = w
2
2) 1S
B =
1
A
(
=
1
w22
)
1I
w4 =
(
1
t2
)
(A+B)
(
=
(
1
t2
)(
1
w22
+ w22
))
Mc
Thus the complexity of the new doubling algorithm is 1I+ 1S+ 1Mc resulting
in a saving of 1M + 1S. The formulae(F) for differential addition(w5) in the
previous section costs 1I + 2M + 2S+ 1Mc. Considering that w
2
2 is computed
both in the differential addition and doubling steps, w22 can be computed
just once. Thus the new total cost of a differential addition and doubling is
2I + 2M + 2S + 2Mc or 1I + 5M + 2S + 2Mc with Montgomery’s Inversion
trick, as compared to the previous total cost of 1I + 6M + 4S+ 2Mc resulting
in an overall saving of 1M + 2S.
The improvements for the Binary Edwards curve defined in [108] can be
summarized as below:
Table 3.2: Differential Arithmetic for Binary Edwards curve
Binary Edwards Previous [108] New [97]
Differential Doubling 1I+1M+1Mc+2S 1I + 1S + 1Mc
Differential Addition
and Doubling
1I+6M+4S+2Mc 1I+5M+2S+2Mc
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Chapter 4
Multi Exponentiation and
Differential Chains
In this chapter, we motivate the need for computing Multi-exponentiation and
the construction of Schoenmakers’ algorithm for Double Scalar multiplication.
We further provide two Triple Scalar multiplication algorithms.
4.1 Addition Chains and Exponentiation
Multi-exponentiation (also known as simultaneous exponentiation) in an
Abelian group is a commonly used computation in cryptography, for example
in signature verification algorithms and identification schemes (Chapter 7 and
Chapter 9 in [103]). A straightforward method to compute the sum of products
n1x1 + n2x2 ∈ G (where (G,+) is an Abelian group and x1, x2 ∈ (G,+) and
the exponents n1, n2 ∈ Z) is to compute n1x1 and n2x2 separately and then
add them. The Strauss-Shamir method ([7], [46], Algorithm 9.23 in [28])
scans the corresponding bit representations of n1 and n2 simultaneously
from left to right and makes use of precomputed group elements to compute
n1x1 + n2x2, thus reducing the number of additions required to compute the
desired sum. The Joint Sparse Form [93] introduced by Solinas in 2001 makes
use of signed representations of the exponents to improve the Strauss-Shamir
method and are useful in groups where inverses of group elements can be
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computed efficiently such as elliptic curve groups. The problem of minimizing
the number of multiplications whilst computing a product, such as n1x1 or
n2x2, can be reduced to minimizing the number of additions in an abstraction
known as an addition chain. A finite sequence of integers a0, a1, . . . ar is called
an addition chain (section 4.63 in [62]) for ar if for each element ai, there
exists aj and ak in the sequence such that
ai = aj + ak, for some k ≤ j < i (4.1)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , r. Addition chains can be used to efficiently compute
either a single exponentiation or multi-exponentiation (by using Strauss’s
method). Addition chains are applicable both in the context of multiplicative
groups and additive groups such as Elliptic curve groups over a finite field.
We know that the arithmetic on a Montgomery curve relies on x-coordinate
only arithmetic and also requires the difference of two group elements (points)
to be known prior to the computation of addition of these two elements. Thus
ordinary addition chains and improvements of these chains cannot be directly
utilized for scalar multiplication on Montgomery curves. A special form of an
addition chain called Lucas chains is useful in this context. A Lucas chain
is a restricted variant of an addition chain where the indices in equation
(4.1) above are such that either j = k or the difference ak − aj is already
part of the chain. A special case of Lucas chains occur when either j = k or
ak − aj = a0 = 1 and this is called the binary chain. A Lucas chain is also
known as a Differential Addition Chain in the literature [9].
4.2 Montgomery’s PRAC
While the Montgomery ladders in the previous sections are instances of
binary chain algorithms to compute scalar multiplication, Montgomery’s
PRAC [81] algorithm, whilst computing scalar multiplication, is an example
of a Lucas chain that is not a binary chain. In [81], the author proposes a
Continued Fraction method for scalar multiplication and calls this algorithm
CFRC. He then proposes a better algorithm than CFRC and calls it a
Practical algorithm(PRAC). The PRAC algorithm permits the exponent
(the scalar) to be either prime or composite. Independent of the scalar being
prime or composite, Montgomery provides a list of transformations that can
be applied to the scalar in the course of performing the computation. This
list can be found in Table 4 of [81]. The PRAC algorithm, in the process
of constructing a Lucas chain for n, begins with (d, e) = (n, dn/φ + 1/2e)
where φ is the golden ratio. The algorithm iteratively uses a list of 9
transformations. At each iteration, the value of the pair (d, e) is reduced
as specified in the transformation and this continues until d = 1 [43]. We
reproduce the 7th and 8th transformations here for convenience:
Condition Action(s)
d ≡ −e (mod 3) d ← (d − 2e)/3 and T1 ← f(A,B,C) and
(A,B)← (X3(A)), f(T1, A,B))
d ≡ e (mod 3) d← (d− e)/3 and
(T1, T2)← (f(A,B,C), f(A,C,B)) and
(A,B,C)← (X3(A), T1, T2)
The above two transformations motivate the use of point tripling.
When PRAC is used with a composite exponent, the transformations
suggested by Montgomery were employed in [99, Algorithm 3.33]. We
reproduce the first two steps of Stam’s algorithm here:
ALGORITHM 3.33 (Montgomery’s PRAC Algorithm)
Given a base v and an exponent n, this algorithm computes vn
1. [Make d odd] Let f2 be the highest power of 2 dividing
n. Set d← (n/2f2) and A← δf2(v).
2. [d 6= 0 (mod 3)] Let f3 be the highest power of 3 dividing
n. Set d← (d/3f3) and A← τ f3(A).
...
...
...
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Here δ is a doubling and τ is a tripling. As seen in step 2 of the algorithm
above, if the exponent is a multiple of three and if f3 is the highest power
of 3 dividing the exponent n, then the algorithm requires f3 triplings. For
instance, if n = 108 = 22 ∗ 33, doublings are carried out twice and triplings
thrice. The dedicated differential tripling formulae introduced in the previous
chapter can be used in this context. The tripling formula can also be used
in the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange (SIDH) algorithm
[54, 34] which is a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm that enables Alice
and Bob to exchange a secret key.
4.3 Algorithms for Multiexponentiation
The Strauss-Shamir method for simultaneous scalar multiplication cannot
be immediately used in the context of Differential Addition Chains(DACs).
However, this technique can be adapted to DACs as shown by Schoenmakers,
who constructed the first algorithm to produce two dimensional (double
scalar) DACs in 2000. This algorithm was published in [99] by Stam
in 2003. Akishita’s algorithm to construct two dimensional DACs was
published in 2001 [2]. Both Shoenmakers’ and Akishita’s algorithms
produce two dimensional binary chains. Bernstein proposed new algorithms
to construct two dimensional DACs in 2006 along with a summary of
previously known algorithms [8]. These included binary chains as well as
Euclidean chain algorithms (algorithms using the Euclidean GCD scheme
to construct DACs). In [5], Azarderakhsh and Karabina propose another DAC.
A natural question to ask is, if one can construct triple scalar multiplication
analogues of the two dimensional DACs listed above. A practical motivation
to construct such multi scalar multiplication algorithms arises in the
implementation of some digital signature and identification schemes and
their elliptic curve analogues. [77, Chapter 11] covers some of these signature
schemes. The Okamoto Identification scheme [103, Section 9.3] requires
a triple scalar multiplication operation to be performed by the signature
verifier. Triple scalar multiplication can also be utilized in the accelerated
verification of ElGamal like signatures [3]. The need for higher order
analogues can be seen in the batch verification of multiple signatures
[25]. In [60], the authors propose three methods for randomized batch
verification of ECDSA signatures, one of which is based on Montgomery
ladders. Simultaneous scalar multiplication in the context of DAC could
be utilized to achieve improved running times in the Montgomery ladder
signature verification method. Interest in higher order DACs also arises
from the recent interest in standardizing Montgomery curves [8] such as
Curve25519. Further motivation to construct higher order DACs is found
in [8], where the author presents new double scalar DAC algorithms and writes
Perhaps 3-dimensional versions of the ideas in this paper will also save time
in the recent elliptic-curve-signature-verification algorithm . . . . I will leave
this exploration to future research.
This exploration can be extended to other double scalar multiplication
algorithms too, such as Akishita’s and Schoenmakers’. In 2006, Brown
extended Bernstein’s ideas to dimensions ≥ 2 [19], but this method is
patented [20].
Before we look at 3-dimensional extensions, we will introduce some
2-dimensional algorithms to produce binary chains.
4.4 Schoenmakers’ Algorithm
In this section, we motivate the construction of the Schoenmakers’ algorithm
[94, 99]. Towards this end, we define a set of four points
Gi =

miP + niQ,
miP + (ni + 1)Q
(mi + 1)P + niQ
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q

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for mi = (kt . . . ki)2, ni = (lt . . . li)2. Below we show the construction of
elements of Gi from Gi+1 for all four combinations of (ki, li):
1. (ki, li) = (0, 0): here mi = 2mi+1 and ni = 2ni+1.
miP + niQ = 2(mi+1P + ni+1Q)
(mi + 1)P + niQ = ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q)
miP + (ni + 1)Q = (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q)
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q = ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
2. (ki, li) = (1, 0): here mi = 2mi+1 + 1 and ni = 2ni+1.
miP + niQ = ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q)
(mi + 1)P + niQ = 2((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q)
miP + (ni + 1)Q = ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
((mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q = ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q)
3. (ki, li) = (0, 1): here mi = 2mi+1 and ni = 2ni+1 + 1.
miP + niQ = (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q)
(mi + 1)P + niQ = ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
miP + (ni + 1)Q = 2(mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
((mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q = ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
4. (ki, li) = (1, 1): here mi = 2mi+1 + 1 and ni = 2ni+1 + 1.
miP + niQ = ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
(mi + 1)P + niQ = ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q)
miP + (ni + 1)Q = ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
((mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q = 2((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
The four elements in Gi, 0 ≤ i ≤ t give rise to the easy double scalar
multiplication binary chain. The easy double scalar multiplication algorithm
is as follows:
Algorithm 4.2: L-R Easy Double scalar multiplication algorithm
INPUT: Points P and Q on Em; positive integers k = (kt . . . k0)2 and l =
(lt . . . l0)2;
Precompute (P −Q)
OUTPUT: The point [k]P + [l]Q
[Initialize]
P1 ← 0; P2 ← P ; P3 ← Q; P4 ← P +Q
[Loop through the scalar bits simultaneously]
for i = t down to 0 do
if (ki, li) = (0, 0) then
P2 ← P2 +P1 (P);
P3 ← P3 +P1 (Q);
P4 ← P4 +P1 (P+Q);
P1 ← 2 ∗ P1
else if (ki, li) = (1, 0) then
P1 ← P2 +P1 (P);
P3 ← P2 +P3 (P-Q);
P4 ← P4 +P2 (Q);
P2 ← 2 ∗ P2
else if (ki, li) = (0, 1) then
P1 ← P3 +P1 (Q);
P2 ← P2 +P3 (P-Q);
P4 ← P4 +P3 (P);
P3 ← 2 ∗ P3
else if (ki, li) = (1, 1) then
P1 ← P4 +P1 (P+Q);
P2 ← P4 +P2 (Q);
P3 ← P4 +P3 (P);
P4 ← 2 ∗ P4
end for
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[m0P + n0Q is in P1]
return P1
However, to compute m0P + n0Q, it is not necessary to use all the four
elements of Gi. If we omit (mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q in Gi, it is still possible to
compute the rest of the elements in all of the Gi, 0 ≤ i ≤ t. Amongst the
above set of formulae, for the cases where (ki, li) = (0, 0) or (1, 0) or (0, 1), no
change is required, except omitting (mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q. However, when
(ki, li) = (1, 1), (mi+1)P+niQ and miP+(ni+1)Q may have to be computed
differently from the formula above, as they depend on (mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q
in Gi+1. Therefore when (ki, li) = (1, 1), we use
(mi + 1)P + niQ = ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q)
= ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + P
The difference between the first two terms in the above rewritten equation is
(P −Q). The difference between the first two terms taken together which is
((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) and P
can also be expressed in terms of elements in Gi+1 i.e.,
((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q)− (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) = (P −Q)
((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)− P
= 2mi+1P + (2ni+1 + 1)Q
= (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q)
Similarly,
miP + (ni + 1)Q = (mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)
= ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) +Q
As before, the difference between the first two terms in the above rewritten
equation is (P −Q). The difference between the first two terms taken together
which is
((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q) and Q
can also be expressed in terms of elements in Gi+1 i.e.,
((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q)−Q
= (2mi+1 + 1)P + 2ni+1Q
= ((mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q)
If we denote the reduced Gi i.e., Gi without (mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q as G
′
i and
the elements
(miP + niQ), ((mi + 1)P + niQ) and (miP + (ni + 1)Q) as P1[i], P2[i] and
P3[i] respectively, then for the case (ki, li) = (1, 1), the elements of G
′
i can be
computed as follows:
P1[i]← P2[i+ 1] + P3[i+ 1] (P −Q)
P2[i]← P1[i] + P (P3[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1])
P3[i]← P1[i] +Q (P2[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1])
Thus in order to compute P2[i] and P3[i], we need to first compute P3[i +
1] + P1[i+ 1] and P2[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1]. The difference between P3[i+ 1] and
P1[i+ 1] is Q and the difference between P2[i+ 1] and P1[i+ 1] is P and thus
it is possible to compute both P3[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1] and P2[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1].
Rules for the other cases can be constructed from the formulae above. For
example when (ki, li) = (0, 0),
P1[i]← 2P1[i+ 1]
P2[i]← P2[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1] (P )
P3[i]← P3[i+ 1] + P1[i+ 1] (Q)
As stated previously, Schoenmakers’ algorithm was designed in 2000 and
published in [99]. The derivation is not available in [99]. In [9, Section 4], the
author specifies which one of the four elements of Gi is eliminated. We fill this
gap by motivating the construction here and this helps us in constructing the
three-dimensional analogue of Schoenmakers’ algorithm in the next section.
Doing away with the array notation for P1, P2 and P3 above, we can present
Schoenmakers’ algorithm for double scalar multiplication as follows:
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Algorithm 4.3: L-R Schoenmakers’ Double scalar multiplication algorithm
INPUT: Points P and Q on Em; positive integers k = (kt . . . k0)2 and
l = (lt . . . l0)2;
Precompute (P −Q)
OUTPUT: The point [k]P + [l]Q
[Initialize]
P1 ← 0; P2 ← P ; P3 ← Q
[Loop through the scalar bits simultaneously]
for i = t down to 0 do
P1Store ← P1; P2Store ← P2; P3Store ← P3;
if (ki, li) = (0, 0) then
P1 ← 2 ∗ P1Store ;
P2 ← P2Store +P1Store (P) ;
P3 ← P3Store +P1Store (Q)
else if (ki, li) = (1, 0) then
P1 ← P2Store +P1Store (P) ;
P2 ← 2 ∗ P2Store ;
P3 ← P2Store +P3Store (P-Q)
else if (ki, li) = (0, 1) then
P1 ← P3Store +P1Store (Q) ;
P2 ← P2Store +P3Store (P-Q) ;
P3 ← 2 ∗ P3Store
else if (ki, li) = (1, 1) then
P1 ← P2Store +P3Store (P-Q) ;
P2Partial ← P3Store +P1Store (Q)
P3Partial ← P2Store +P1Store (P) ;
P2 ← P1 + P (P2Partial) ;
P3 ← P1 +Q (P3Partial)
end if
end for
[m0P + n0Q is in P1]
return P1
We now compare Schoenmakers’ algorithm for double scalar multiplication
(Algorithm 4.3) with the straightforward method of achieving the same.
Since in the For loop in Algorithm 4.3, (ki, li) can take on any of the four
values of (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0) and (1, 1) with equal probability, the average
cost per bit of the two scalars taken simultaneously can be computed as follows:
when (ki, li) 6= (1, 1):
three point additions are required.
i.e, 3(3M + 2S) = (9M + 6S) operations.
when (ki, li) = (1, 1):
five point additions are required.
out of these five, three require (3M + 2S) operations.
the other two require 4M + 2S operations (as Z-coordinate of P2Partial,
P3Partial 6= 1).
resulting in a total of 3(3M +2S)+2(4M +2S) = (17M +10S) operations
Thus on the average
(3(9M + 6S) + 3(3M + 2S) + 2(4M + 2S))
4
= (11M + 7S)
operations would be required to run Algorithm 4.3 for every bit of the two
scalars taken together.
The straightforward method of computing [k]P + [l]Q constitutes computing
[k]P and [l]Q separately, recovering the Y-coordinates of [k]P and [l]Q and
adding up [k]P and [l]Q in projective coordinates ([2, Section 2.1]). If we
take the bit lengths of scalars k and l to be the same and equal to |k|, then
this method requires (12|k|+ 28)M + (8|k|S). If one ignores the complexity
of recovering the Y-coordinates and the complexity of adding up [k]P and
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[l]Q, then the complexity of the straightforward method per bit of the scalar
multiple is ((12|k|)M + (8|k|)S)/|k| = 12M + 8S operations. This can also
be inferred from the fact that the total complexity to compute nP using
the binary ladder is (6M + 4S)(|n| − 1) for Montgomery curves where |n| is
the bit length of n [refer to Remarks 13.36, page 288 in [28]]. Thus, on the
average, Schoenmakers’ algorithm performs better than the straightforward
method for double scalar multiplication.
The best case per bit cost of running the Schoenmakers’ double scalar
multiplication algorithm is (9M + 6S), and this occurs when none of the
(ki, li) 6= (1, 1). Under these circumstances Schoenmakers’ algorithm will
perform better than the straightforward algorithm.
The worst case per bit cost to run Algorithm 4.3 is (17M + 10S), and this
occurs when all of the (ki, li) = (1, 1). Thus, under worst case conditions,
the straightforward algorithm is better than the Schoenmakers’ algorithm for
double scalar multiplication.
In comparing the costs here, we have not taken into consideration the costs of
the precomputation in the Schoenmakers’ algorithm and at the same time we
have not taken into consideration the cost of recovering the Y -Coordinates
and adding up [k]P and [l]Q in the straightforward method as these are small
constant time costs and do not impact the comparison above. The cost per
bit is summarized in the table below.
Table 4.1: 2-Dimensional Exponentiation
Algorithm Cost per bit
Straight forward algorithm 12M + 8S
Schoenmakers’ algorithm
(average case)
11M + 7S
Akishita’s algorithm 9M + 6S
4.5 Schoenmakers’ Algorithm for Triple
Scalar Multiplication
We now extend Schoenmakers’ ideas for triple scalar multiplication. We
do not explicitly derive the algorithm as the derivation is very similar to
that of the double scalar multiplication algorithm. However, we do note
that in every G′i, where the G
′
i is analogous to that used in the double
scalar multiplication case, G′i = {miP + niQ+ SiR, (mi + 1)P + niQ+ SiR,
miP + (ni + 1)Q+SiR, miP +niQ+ (Si + 1)R, (mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+SiR}.
Taking (miP +niQ+SiR), ((mi+1)P +niQ+SiR), (miP +(ni+1)Q+SiR),
(miP + niQ+ (Si + 1)R) and ((mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ SiR) to be P1 P2, P3,
P4 and P5 respectively, the algorithm for triple scalar multiplication is as
follows:
Algorithm 4.4: L-R Schoenmakers’ triple scalar multiplication algorithm
INPUT: Points P , Q and R on Em;
Positive integers k = (kt . . . k0)2, l = (lt . . . l0)2, s = (st . . . s0)2
Precompute (P +Q), (P −Q), (P −R), (Q−R), (P +Q−R)
OUTPUT: The point [k]P + [l]Q+ [s]R
[Initialize]
P1 ← 0;P2 ← P ; P3 ← Q; P4 ← R; P5 ← P +Q
for i = t down to 0 do
P1Store ← P1;
P2Store ← P2;
P3Store ← P3;
P4Store ← P4;
P5Store ← P5;
if (ki, li, si) = (0, 0, 0) then
P1 ← 2 ∗ P1Store ;
P2 ← P2Store +P1Store (P) ;
P3 ← P3Store +P1Store (Q) ;
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P4 ← P4Store +P1Store (R) ;
P5 ← P5Store +P1Store (P+Q)
else if (ki, li, si) = (0, 0, 1) then
P1 ← P4Store +P1Store (R) ;
P2 ← P2Store +P4Store (P-R) ;
P3 ← P3Store +P4Store (Q-R) ;
P4 ← 2 ∗ P4Store ;
P5 ← P5Store +P4Store (P+Q-R)
else if (ki, li, si) = (0, 1, 0) then
P1 ← P3Store +P1Store (Q) ;
P2 ← P2Store +P3Store (P-Q) ;
P3 ← 2 ∗ P3Store ;
P4 ← P3Store +P4Store (Q-R) ;
P5 ← P5Store +P3Store (P)
else if (ki, li, si) = (0, 1, 1) then
P1 ← P3Store +P4Store (Q-R) ;
P2 ← P5Store +P4Store (P+Q-R) ;
P3Partial ← P4Store +P1Store (R);
P4Partial ← P3Store +P1Store (Q) ;
P5Partial ← P2Store +P4Store (P-R) ;
P3 ← P1 +Q (P3Partial) ;
P4 ← P1 +R (P4Partial) ;
P5 ← P2 +Q (P5Partial)
else if (ki, li, si) = (1, 0, 0) then
P1 ← P2Store +P1Store (P) ;
P2 ← 2 ∗ P2Store ;
P3 ← P2Store +P3Store (P-Q) ;
P4 ← P2Store +P4Store (P-R) ;
P5 ← P5Store +P2Store (Q)
else if (ki, li, si) = (1, 0, 1) then
P1 ← P2Store +P4Store (P-R);
P3 ← P5Store +P4Store (P+Q-R) ;
P2Partial ← P4Store +P1Store (R);
P4Partial ← P2Store +P1Store (P) ;
P5Partial ← P3Store +P4Store (Q-R) ;
P2 ← P1 + P (P2Partial) ;
P4 ← P1 +R (P4Partial) ;
P5 ← P3 + P (P5Partial)
else if (ki, li, si) = (1, 1, 0) then
P1 ← P5Store +P1Store (P+Q) ;
P2 ← P5Store +P2Store (Q) ;
P3 ← P5Store +P3Store (P) ;
P4 ← P5Store +P4Store (P+Q-R);
P5 ← 2 ∗ P5Store
else if (ki, li, si) = (1, 1, 1) then
P1 ← P5Store +P4Store (P+Q-R) ;
P2Partial ← P3Store +P4Store (Q-R) ;
P3Partial ← P2Store +P4Store (P-R) ;
P4Partial ← P2Store +P3Store (P-Q) ;
P5Partial ← P4Store +P1Store (R) ;
P2 ← P1 + P (P2Partial);
P3 ← P1 +Q (P3Partial);
P4 ← P1 +R (P4Partial);
P5 ← P1 + (P +Q) (P5Partial)
end if
end for
return P1
We now compute the per bit average cost of the above algorithm.
When (ki, li, si) = (0, 0, 0) or (0, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 0) or (1, 0, 0) or (1, 1, 0):
five point additions are required.
i.e, 5(3M + 2S) = (15M + 10S) operations.
When (ki, li, si) = (0, 1, 1) or (1, 0, 1):
eight point additions are required.
Out of these eight, five require (3M + 2S) operations each
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i.e., 5(3M + 2S) = 15M + 10S.
The other three require 4M + 2S operations each
i.e., 3(4M + 2S) = 12M + 6S.
resulting in a total of (27M + 16S) operations.
When (ki, li, si) = (1, 1, 1):
nine point additions are required.
Out of these nine, five require (3M + 2S) operations
each i.e., 5(3M + 2S) = 15M + 10S.
The other four require 4M + 2S operations each
i.e., 4(4M + 2S) = 16M + 8S.
resulting in a total of (31M + 18S) operations.
Thus, on average,
(5(15M + 10S) + 2(27M + 16S) + (31M + 18S))
8
= (20M + 12.5S)
operations are required to run Algorithm 4.4 for every bit of the exponent.
The cost per bit when the straightforward algorithm is used is
6(3M + 2S) = (18M + 12S) operations. Thus, on the average, the
straightforward algorithm performs better than Schoenmakers’ algorithm for
triple scalar multiplication.
In the best case, the per bit cost of running Algorithm 4.4 is
5(3M + 2S) = (15M + 10S) and this occurs when (ki, li, si) = (0, 0, 0)
or (0, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 0) or (1, 0, 0) or (1, 1, 0). Under these circumstances,
Schoenmakers’ algorithm performs better than the straightforward algorithm.
The worst case per bit cost of Schoenmakers’ algorithm is 31M + 18S, and
this occurs when all of (ki, li, si) = (1, 1, 1). Thus under worst case conditions,
the straightforward algorithm would perform better than the Schoenmakers’
algorithm for triple scalar multiplication.
The best case, average and worst case comparisons between the Schoenmakers’
algorithm and the straightforward method can be summarized as in the table
below. The table lists the better option between Schoenmakers’ algorithm
and the straightforward method under best case, average and worst case
conditions.
While the straightforward algorithm is uniform, where three differential
point additions and one point doubling are required for every possible bit
combination in the scalar, the Schoenmakers’ algorithm does not have a
uniform structure and is thus susceptible to side-channel attacks, when used
in protocols where the scalar is a secret.
Double scalar Schoenmaker Triple scalar Schoenmaker
vs vs
Straightforward Straightforward
Best Case Schoenmakers Schoenmakers
Average Schoenmakers Straightforward
Worst Straightforward Straightforward
Thus, there is a need to construct other triple scalar algorithms not dependent
on Schoenmakers’ Algorithm. Next, we extend the Akishita’s algorithm to
triple scalar multiplication. Our results in this chapter are independent of
Brown’s results in [19].
Closely following the approach in [2] and letting |n| denote the bit
length of n, computation of nP on a Montgomery curve Em requires
(6|n| − 3)M + (4|n| − 2)S operations. To compute the x-coordinate of
kP + lQ + uR on Em, using the straightforward method, we require the
following steps:
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1. Compute kP using the Montgomery ladder.
2. Recover Y -coordinate of kP .
3. Compute lQ using the Montgomery ladder.
4. Recover Y -coordinate of lQ.
5. Compute uR using the Montgomery ladder.
6. Recover Y -coordinate of uR.
7. Compute kP + lQ+ uR in projective coordinates.
8. Compute x-coordinate(affine) of kP + lQ+ uR.
We will assume the bit length of all three scalars k, l and u to be the
same. The algorithm for recovery of the Y -coordinate is described in [84]
and this costs (12M + S) operations. Then, the computational cost of
step 1, 3 and 5 together is 3
[
(6|k| − 3)M + (4|k| − 2)S]. Steps 2, 4 and
6 together cost 3(12M + S). Consistent with [2], the cost of projective
addition is 10M + 2S, and thus the total cost of Step 7 is 2(10M + 2S)
while step 8 costs M + I where I denotes a field inversion. Thus, the cost of
computing the x-coordinate of kP+lQ+sR is (18|k|+48)M+(12|k|+3)S+I.
4.6 Three-Dimensional Scalar Multiplication
on a Montgomery Curve
Akishita’s algorithm[2] computes two dimensional differential scalar
multiplication by proceeding as in the case of Schoenmakers’ algorithm
(Section 4.4). There is a difference, however. In the case of Schoenmaker’s
algorithm, the total number of differential point additions and doublings is
3 when (ki, li) 6= (1, 1) and 5 when (ki, li) = (1, 1), whereas in Akishita’s
algorithm, by performing some lookahead, the total number of differential
point additions and doublings is reduced to 3 for all possible bit patterns in
the scalar.
In this section, we extend Akishita’s ideas [2] to compute kP + lQ+ uR. We
define a set of 8 points
Gi =

miP + niQ+ siR
miP + niQ+ (si + 1)R
miP + (ni + 1)Q+ siR
miP + (ni + 1)Q+ (si + 1)R
(mi + 1)P + niQ+ siR
(mi + 1)P + niQ+ (si + 1)R
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ siR
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ (si + 1)R

for mi = (kt . . . ki)2, ni = (lt . . . li)2 and si = (ut . . . ui)2 where (kt . . . k1k0)2,
(lt . . . l1l0)2 and (ut . . . u1u0)2 are binary representations of k, l and u
respectively; mi = 2mi+1 or mi = (2mi+1 + 1) depending on whether ki = 0
or ki = 1. Similar relationships hold for ni and si i.e., if li = 0, ni = 2ni+1
else ni = (2ni+1 + 1); if ui = 0, si = 2si+1 else si = (2si+1 + 1). Each of the 8
elements in Gi can be written in terms of the elements in Gi+1. For instance,
when (ki, li, ui) = (0, 1, 0) we can write mi = 2mi+1, ni = (2ni+1 + 1) and
si = 2si+1. In this case, as examples, we show a couple of elements of Gi
written in terms of elements in Gi+1 as follows:
miP + niQ+ siR = (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R)
and
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ siR = (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R)+
((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R) .
We can write the other six elements of Gi similarly, in terms of elements of
Gi+1. However, whilst computing the elements in Gi, we do not want to be
using all of the eight elements in Gi+1 towards computing (kP + lQ+ uR),
because this would be more expensive than the straightforward computation of
kP + lQ+ uR. Straightforward computation using the binary ladder requires
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two such elements to be processed for each bit in the binary representation
of a scalar and thus a total of six elements need to be processed for every bit
in the three scalars taken at a time. Hence, to make our method more cost
effective than the straightforward method, the number of elements in each
Gi+1 should be less than 6. It turns out that it is enough to have five elements
in each of the Gi+1 to achieve our goal of computing (kP + lQ + uR). For
example, if (ki, li, ui) = (0, 0, 0), it suffices to have the following five elements
in Gi+1: 
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R
(mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R

.
(4.2)
If (ki, li, ui) = (0, 1, 0), the following 5 elements in Gi+1 suffice:
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ (si+1 + 1)R

.
(4.3)
Next, we need to construct rules for computing elements of Gi from Gi+1. For
this, we take into consideration the values of ki−1, li−1 and ui−1 in addition to
ki, li and ui . We show this with an example. Let (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0). Then mi = 2mi+1, ni = 2ni+1, si = 2si+1. The five elements
of Gi+1 are the same as those depicted in equation (4.2) above. The five
elements of Gi are
miP + niQ+ siR
miP + (ni + 1)Q+ siR
miP + (ni + 1)Q+ (si + 1)R
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ siR
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ (si + 1)R

.
(4.4)
These five elements of Gi can be computed from those of Gi+1 as follows:
miP + niQ+ siR = (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R) + (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R),
miP + (ni + 1)Q+ siR
= (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R),
miP + (ni + 1)Q+ (si + 1)R
= (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R) + (mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R),
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ siR
= (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R) + ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R) and
(mi + 1)P + (ni + 1)Q+ (si + 1)R
= (mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R) + ((mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R).
If elements of Gi+1 are listed as T0Tmp, T1Tmp, T2Tmp, T3Tmp and T4Tmp
in the same order as in equation (4.2) above, and the elements of Gi are listed
as T0, T1, T2, T3 and T4 in the same order as in equation (4.4) above, then
the following rules enable us to compute elements of Gi from those of Gi+1:
T0 ← 2T0Tmp,
T1 ← T2Tmp+ T0Tmp (Q),
T2 ← T2Tmp+ T1Tmp (Q−R),
T3 ← T4Tmp+ T0Tmp (P +Q) and
T4 ← T4Tmp+ T1Tmp (P +Q−R) .
As in the case of the formulae in the Montgomery ladder, the values in
the brackets beside the formula above give the difference between points
being added as these differences would be required for differential addition
point arithmetic. While we derived the Montgomery ladder rules when
(ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0), similar rules can be derived for the
other 63 possible binary combinations of (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1). Whilst we
do not explicitly derive these rules here, we list below the five element set
Gi+1 for all combinations of (ki, li, ui) that was used in the construction of
the 3 dimensional extension of Akishita’s algorithm.
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Table 4.2: Five element set Gi+1
(ki, li, ui) = (0, 0, 0) : (ki, li, ui) = (0, 0, 1) :
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ si+1R (mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R (mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R
(ki, li, ui) = (0, 1, 0) : (ki, li, ui) = (0, 1, 1) :
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ (si+1 + 1)R mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R (mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R
(ki, li, ui) = (1, 0, 0) : (ki, li, ui) = (1, 0, 1) :
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
(mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ si+1R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R (mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ si+1R
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R (mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R (mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R
(ki, li, ui) = (1, 1, 0) : (ki, li, ui) = (1, 1, 1) :
mi+1P + ni+1Q+ si+1R mi+1P + ni+1Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R mi+1P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ (si+1 + 1)R
(mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ si+1R (mi+1 + 1)P + ni+1Q+ (si+1R + 1)
(mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R (mi+1 + 1)P + (ni+1 + 1)Q+ si+1R
(mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R (mi+1+1)P+(ni+1+1)Q+(si+1+1)R
We present the 3-dimensional Montgomery ladder in the Appendix (Algorithm
A.1). We now analyze Algorithm A.1 when applied to Montgomery curves.
As in the previous section, we will take the bit lengths of all the three scalars
to be the same. Computing P + Q and P − Q in affine coordinates costs
4M + 2S + I. Similarly points ((P + R), (P − R)), ((Q + R), (Q − R))
and ((P + Q + R), (P + Q − R)) need to be precomputed as well in
affine coordinates. Thus the total cost of the precomputation steps in
Algorithm A.1 is 4 ∗ (4M + 2S + I) = 16M + 8S + 4I. The cost of a
point addition in the above ladder would be 3M + 2S, as the difference
of the points added is in affine form (i.e., Z = 1). In the For loop of the
above algorithm, either point addition formulae are required four times
and point doubling once or alternatively, the point addition formula is
required five times per bit of the scalar k. Thus, the cost for every bit
of k is 5 ∗ (3M + 2S) = 15M + 10S and the total cost of the for loop
in the above algorithm is 15(|k| − 1)M + 10(|k| − 1)S. The finalization
step after the for loop costs 3M + 2S. Computation of the x-coordinate
by x = X/Z costs M + I. Thus the total cost of the above algorithm is
(15|k|+ 5)M + 10|k|S + 5I. If |k| = 160, S/M = 0.8 and I/M = 30, the cost
of the above algorithm is 3835M .
For the same set of parameters, the cost of the straightforward algorithm as
calculated in Section-2 is (18|k|+ 48)M + (12|k|+ 3)S + I = 4496M . Thus
simultaneous triple scalar multiplication results in about 15% improvement
over the straightforward method. When |k| = 256, the improvement is
approximately 22% as the three dimensional Montgomery ladder costs
6043M and the straightforward method costs 7761M .
As in the case of the one dimensional Montgomery ladder (Algorithm 3.1),
the three dimensional Montgomery ladder (Algorithm A.1) can be adapted
to work with differential addition extensions to various other forms of elliptic
curves(examples listed previously in Section 3.3 of this thesis) and not limited
to Montgomery curves alone.
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The usage of temporary variables can be improved in the above algorithm
(Algorithm A.1). Some operations towards the end of the computation can
be eliminated. In the last iteration of the for loop in the above algorithm
computation of T2 and T4 can be done away with, thus resulting in a further
saving of at least 6M and 4S operations. Further, the cost of some finite
field additions can be done away with by combining some point additions.
For example if one has to compute T3 ← T4Tmp + T0Tmp (P+Q) and T4 ←
T4Tmp+T1Tmp (P+Q-R) where T0Tmp=(X0, Y0, Z0), T1Tmp=(X1, Y1, Z1),
P + Q = (X2, Y2, Z2), (P + Q − R) = (X3, Y3, Z3), T4Tmp=(X4, Y4, Z4),
T3=(X5, Y5, Z5) and T4=(X6, Y6, Z6) then
X5 = Z2[(X0 − Z0)(X4 + Z4) + (X0 + Z0)(X4 − Z4)]2 and
X6 = Z3[(X1 − Z1)(X4 + Z4) + (X1 + Z1)(X4 − Z4)]2 while
Z5 = X2[(X0 − Z0)(X4 + Z4)− (X0 + Z0)(X4 − Z4)]2 and
Z6 = X3[(X1 − Z1)(X4 + Z4)− (X1 + Z1)(X4 − Z4)]2 .
Thus one could group the computations of T3 and T4 together, thereby
computing (X4 + Z4) and (X4 − Z4) just once, thus saving 2 field additions.
In general the addition of points T2 + T0, T1 + T0 can save 2 field additions
and can be extended to saving n field additions whilst computing Tn + T0,
Tn−1+T0, . . . ,T1+T0. Similar benefits can be obtained when one combines the
point addition and doubling operations together. These enhancements can be
utilized to improve the performance of the 3 dimensional Montgomery Ladder.
The 3-dimensional Montgomery ladder is not a uniform algorithm and thus,
as in the case of Schoenmakers’ algorithm, can be susceptible to side-channel
attacks.
Chapter 5
Precomputation of Elliptic
Curve Points for Jacobian
Coordinates for Double Scalar
Multiplication
In this chapter we review two precomputation schemes from the literature for
double scalar multiplication. As a prelude, we recall from the literature, the
formulae for point arithmetic for Jacobian coordinate point representation on
Weierstrass curves including a review of Conjugate addition and Co-Z addition.
Of the two precomputation schemes we review here, one is dependent on
Conjugate addition [72] and the other on Co-Z addition[71]. We find that
some of the results based on Co-Z addition in [71] are incorrect. We construct
new double scalar multiplication algorithms for precomputation based on
Conjugate addition and then show that precomputation algorithms for elliptic
curve double scalar multiplication based on Co-Z addition are not necessarily
faster than those based on Conjugate addition.
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5.1 Point Arithmetic Formulae for Jacobian
Coordinates on Elliptic Curves
In Section 2.1.5, we looked at point addition and doubling formulae for
Jacobian coordinates. Longa and Miri in [73] improved the operation counts
for Jacobian coordinates. We recall some of their formulae and operation
counts.
If P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) and P2 = (X2, Y2, Z1) then P3 = P1 + P2 = (X3, Y3, Z3)
is given by
X3 = α
2 − (4β3 + 8Z22X1β2),
Y3 = α(Z
2
2X1β
2 −X3)− Z32Y1α3,
Z3 = θβ, (5.1)
where
α = 2(Z31Y2 − Z32Y1),
β = Z21X2 − Z22X1,
θ = (Z1 + Z2)
2 − Z21 − Z22 .
The cost of computing point addition using the above formulae is 11M + 5S
which is an improvement on the 12M + 4S scheme depicted in Section (2.1).
If P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) and P2 = (X2, Y2, 1) (called Mixed Addition), then
P3 = P1 + P2 = (X3, Y3, Z3) is given by
X3 = α
2 − 4β3 − 8X1β2,
Y3 = α(4X1β
2 −X3)− 8Y1β3, and
Z3 = (Z1 + β)
2 − Z21 − β2,
(5.2)
where α = 2(Z31Y2 − Y1) and β = Z21X2 −X1. Thus the cost of computing
addition of two points when one of the points is in affine form is 7M + 4S. If
both the points P1 and P2 are in affine form, then the cost is further reduced
to 4M + 2S.
We now recall the fast Point Tripling formulae as given in [73]. If P =
(X1, Y1, Z1) then 3P = (X3, Y3, Z3) can be computed as follows
X3 = 16Y
2
1 (2β − 2α) + 4X1ω2,
Y3 = 8Y1
[
2α− 2β)(4β − 2α)− ω3],
Z3 = (Z1 + ω)
2 − Z21 − ω2,
where
2α = (θ + ω)2 − θ2 − ω2,
2β = 16Y 41 ,
θ = 3X21 + aZ
4
1 ,
ω = 6(
[
(X1 + Y
2
1 )
2 −X21 − Y 41
]
)− θ2 .
The cost of computing the above tripling formulae is (6M + 10S). When
a = −3, the tripling formulae is the same as that above except for
θ = 3X21 + aZ
4
1 which can be written as θ = 3(X1 + Z
2
1 )(X1 − Z21 ). The cost
of tripling in this case is (7M + 7S). When the point P is in affine form, i.e.,
Z1 = 1 and 3P is given in projective form, the cost of tripling (called Mixed
Tripling) is reduced to (5M + 7S).
In [74], the authors develop so called Doubling-Tripling formulae useful in
the computation of 6P + Q where P and Q are elliptic curve points. The
authors develop a fast algorithm to compute 6P by first doubling, that is
computing 2P and then tripling this to yield 6P . They provide a 9M + 15S
algorithm to compute 6P as some of the terms computed during doubling can
be reused whilst tripling. However, there is a minor error in their algorithm
and we provide a corrected version of the doubling-tripling algorithm. If
P = (X1, Y1, Z1), 2P = (X2, Y2, Z2) can be computed as below:
X2 = A
2 − 2B, Y2 = A.(B −X2)− 8D,Z2 = (Y1 + Z1)2 − C − E,
where
A = 3G+H,B = 2[(X1 + C)
2 −G−D], C = Y 21 , D = C2,
E = Z21 , F = E
2, G = X21 , H = a.F
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Further 6P can be computed by tripling 2P as follows:
X3 = I.T +X, Y3 = 8Y2.(V −W ), Z3 = 2Z2.P
where
I = Y 22 , J = I
2, K = 16D.H,L = X22 ,M = 3L+K,N = M
2,
P = [(X2 + I)
2−L− J ]−N,R = P 2, S = (M +P )2−N −R, T = 16J − S,
U = 16J + T, V = −T.U,W = P.R,X = 4X2.R
This algorithm is the same as in [74], except for the computation of N and
P . We next look at Conjugate Addition.
5.2 Conjugate Addition
We recall from Section 2.1.4 of this thesis, the idea of simultaneously
computing P ± Q with a reduced operation count. In [72], the authors
provided algorithms to add elliptic curve points with the form P ± Q
and called it Conjugate Addition. The previous section provided point
addition formulae for P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) and P2 = (X2, Y2, Z2). Given
that P1 + P2 = P3 = (X3, Y3, Z3) is computed using Equation (5.1),
P1 − P2 = P4 = (X4, Y4, Z4) can be computed as follows:
X4 = γ
2 − (4β3 + 8Z22X1β2),
Y4 = γ(Z
2
2X1β
2 −X4)− Z32Y1β3,
Z4 = Z3,
where
γ = −2(Z31Y2 + Z32Y1),
β = Z21X2 − Z22X1 .
All the terms in the above formulae for P4 are already computed whilst
computing P3 except for γ
2 and the product of γ and (Z22X1β
2 −X4). Thus
the cost of computing P4 after that of P3 is reduced to 1M + 1S.
5.2.1 Conjugate Mixed Addition
When one of the points being added is in affine form, that is, when P1 =
(X1, Y1, Z1), P2 = (X2, Y2, 1) and P1 + P2 = P3 = (X3, Y3, Z3), and given that
P3 is computed using Equation (5.2), P1 − P2 = P4 = (X4, Y4, Z4) can be
computed as follows:
X4 = γ
2 − (4β3 + 8X1β2),
Y4 = γ(4X1β
2 −X4)− 8Y1β3,
Z4 = Z3,
where
γ = −2(Z31Y2 + Z32Y1),
β = Z21X2 − Z22X1 .
All the terms in the above formulae for for P4 are already computed whilst
computing P3 except for γ
2 and the product of γ and (4X1β
2 −X4). Thus,
the cost of computing P4 after that of P3 is 1M + 1S. Similarly when both
points P1 and P2 are in affine form, the cost of computing their difference
would cost 1M + 1S after their sum is computed.
5.3 Co-Z Addition
In [76], Meloni proposed a new approach to point addition that is well suited
to Euclidean addition chains. If the two points to be added P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1)
and P2 = (X2, Y2, Z2) have the same Z-coordinate, that is Z1 = Z2 = Z, then
the following formulae can be utilized to compute P3 = P1+P2 = (X3, Y3, Z3):
X3 = D −B − C,
Y3 = (Y2 − Y1)(B −X3)− Y1(C −B),
Z3 = Z(X2 −X1),
91
where
A = (X2 −X1)2, (5.3)
B = X1A,
C = X2A, and
D = (Y2 − Y1)2 .
The operation count of the above algorithm is 5M + 2S. Now, it so happens
that P1 and P3 can have the same Z coordinate as
P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) ∼ (X1(X2 −X1)2, Y1(X2 −X1)3, Z(X2 −X1))
and the expressions
X1A = X1(X2 −X1)2, Y1(C −B) = Y1(X2 −X1)3, Z3 = Z(X2 −X1)
have already been computed. Thus, P1 has been updated with the
Z-coordinate of P1 + P2 without using any extra computations.
5.3.1 Point Tripling with Co-Z Update
Using the idea of Co-Z Addition, the authors in [71] construct a
(i) point tripling with update algorithm, and
(ii)Co-Z addition with update algorithm,
before utilizing them in constructing a precomputation table that can
then be used to compute a double-scalar multiplication. We look at the
precomputation scheme in the next section, whilst in this section we
revisit the point tripling with update algorithm. If P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) and
P3 = 3P1 = (X3, Y3, Z3), then P3 is computed by first computing 2P such
that P and 2P = (X2, Y2, Z2) has the same Z coordinate and then using
Meloni’s scheme above to compute 3P . 2P can be computed as follows:
X2 = −2A+B2,
Y2 = −8Y 41 +B(A−X32 ), and
Z2 = 2Y1Z1,
where
(5.4)
A = 4X1Y
2
1 ,
B = 3X21 + aZ
4
1 .
P1 can be updated as follows:
X1 = A,
Y1 = 8Y
4
1 , and
Z1 = Z2 .
Now P2 and P1 have the same Z coordinate, and this requires 4M + 6S
operations to compute as per the above scheme. Further, 3P can be
computed using equation (5.3) which requires (5M + 2S) operations, thus
requiring a total of 9M + 8S operations for the point tripling with update
algorithm.
Now, rewriting Z2 = 2Y1Z1 = (Y1 + Z1)
2 − Y 21 − Z21 and A = 4X1Y 21 =
2((X1 + Y
2
1 )
2 −X21 − Y 41 ), in Equation (5.4) we can replace 2M with 2S and
thus the operation count of the above tripling with update algorithm can be
reduced to (7M + 10S).
5.4 Precomputation of Elliptic Curve points
to compute kP + lQ
5.4.1 Jacobian Coordinates, a = −3
After providing algorithms for Conjugate addition in [72], Longa and Gebotys
used it to generate precomputed tables of the form ciP + diQ where ci, di ∈
{1, 3 . . .m} which can then be used by various algorithms to compute double
scalar multiplication, i.e., kP + lQ where k and l are scalars. In Table 4 of
their paper, the cost of computing 3P, 3Q,P +Q,P −Q, 3P +Q, 3P −Q,P +
3Q,P − 3Q, 3P + 3Q and 3P − 3Q for standard Jacobian coordinates with
curve parameter a = −3, was given as 42M + 32S. This can be improved to
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41M + 31S, resulting in a further saving of 1M + 1S, as shown below. [72,
Table 1] lists costs for point arithmetic using Jacobian representation.
Result Operation Cost (when a = −3)
3P, 3Q 2 Numbers of Mixed Tripling (5M+7S)+(5M+7S)
P ±Q Mixed Addition(both affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(4M+2S)+(1M+1S)
3P ±Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M+4S)+(1M+1S)
P ± 3Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M+4S)+(1M+1S)
3P ±3Q Addition with stored values
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(9M+3S)+(1M+1S)
As in Section 5.1 addition of points in Projective coordinates (Weierstrass
curves) costs 11M + 5S. But with the square and cube of the Z-coordinate
of one of the points available, the point addition cost can be reduced to
(10M + 4S). If the square and cube of the Z-coordinate of both the points
are available, the point addition cost can be reduced to (9M + 3S). In the
above scheme, when 3P +Q is computed, both Z23P and Z
3
3P are computed
and do not have to be recomputed when 3P + 3Q is computed. Further,
when P + 3Q is computed, Z23Q and Z
3
3Q is computed and thus does not have
to be recomputed when 3P + 3Q is computed. Thus, the new total cost of
computing 3P, 3Q,P +Q,P −Q, 3P +Q, 3P −Q,P + 3Q,P − 3Q, 3P + 3Q
and 3P −3Q for standard Jacobian coordinates can be reduced to 41M+31S.
5.4.2 Jacobian Coordinates, a 6= −3
In [71], Lin and Zhang propose to improve upon the cost of Longa and
Gebotys’ algorithm for precomputation and thus propose new algorithms to
compute ciP + diQ where ci, di ∈ {1, 3} and ci, di ∈ {1, 3, 5} and the curve
parameter a need not be equal to −3. Their algorithm for ci, di ∈ {1, 3}
utilizes Co-Z point arithmetic formulae proposed in [76] and costs 50M +36S.
Their scheme is as follows:
Lin and Zhang Scheme to compute ciP + diQ where ci, di ∈ {1, 3}
Operation Cost
P +Q and P −Q 11M + 5S
2P = (P +Q) + (P −Q),
2Q = (P +Q)− (P −Q)
and 2P, 2Q,P +Q,P −Q co− Z 7M + 3S
3P +Q = (P +Q) + 2P ,
3P −Q = (P −Q) + 2P ,
3Q+ P = (P +Q) + 2Q,
3Q− P = (Q− P ) + 2Q 4(5M + 2S)
3(P +Q) and 3(P −Q) 2(6M + 10S)
Total 50M + 36S
The authors in [71] then provide a comparison of the costs of their algorithm
with that of Longa and Gebotys, as in the table below:
Algorithm to compute ciP+diQ Cost when ci, di ∈ {1, 3}
Longa and Gebotys [72] 56M + 40S
Lin and Zhang [71] 50M + 36S
From the cost comparison table, the algorithm of [71] should perform better
than the Longa and Gebotys algorithm. However, this is incorrect because
we can structure the Longa and Gebotys algorithm when a 6= −3 and
ci, di ∈ {1, 3} (the number of values each scalar can assume, i.e., the window
size=2) as follows:
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Result Operation Cost (when a 6= −3)
3P, 3Q 2 Numbers of Mixed Tripling (6M+7S)+(6M+7S)
P ±Q Mixed Addition(both affine)+
Conjugate Mixed Addition
(4M+2S)+(1M+1S)
3P ±Q Mixed Addition(one affine)+
Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M+4S)+(1M+1S)
P ± 3Q Mixed Addition(one affine)+
Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M+4S)+(1M+1S)
3P ±3Q Addition with stored values+
Conjugate Mixed Addition
(9M+3S)+(1M+1S)
Thus the total cost of Longa and Gebotys algorithm when a 6= −3 is
43M + 31S and thus it is more efficient than the Lin and Zhang algorithm
which costs 50M + 36S. Moreover, Longa and Gebotys algorithm computes
3P and 3Q whereas the algorithm due to Lin and Zhang [71] does not.
However, it is not required to compute 3P and 3Q.
The authors in [71] further provide an algorithm to compute ciP +diQ, where
ci, di ∈ {1, 3, 5}, which we reproduce below
Lin and Zhang Scheme to compute ciP + diQ where ci, di ∈ {1, 3, 5}
Result Operation Cost
P ±Q P +Q and P −Q 11M + 5S
2P = (P +Q) + (P −Q),
2Q = (P +Q)− (P −Q)
and 2P, 2Q,P +Q,P −Q co− Z 7M+3S
3P ±Q 3P +Q = (P +Q) + 2P ,
3P −Q = (P −Q) + 2P ,
3Q± P 3Q+ P = (P +Q) + 2Q,
3Q− P = (Q− P ) + 2Q, 4(5M+2S)
3(P +Q) 3P + 3Q = 2(P +Q) 4M + 6S
+(P +Q), 5M + 2S
λ 1M
5(P +Q) 5(P +Q) = 3(P +Q)
+2(P +Q) 5M + 2S
Adjusting 3(P +Q), 2P 1M + 1S
and 2Q to be co− Z 4M
5P + 3Q 5P + 3Q = 3(P +Q) + 2P
5Q+ 3P 5Q+ 3P = 3(P +Q) + 2Q 2(5M+2S)
97
Result Operation Cost
3P − 3Q 3P − 3Q = 2(P −Q) 4M + 6S
+(P −Q), 5M + 2S
λ 1M
5(P −Q) 5(P −Q) = 3(P −Q)
+2(P −Q) 5M + 2S
Adjusting 3(P −Q), 2P 1M + 1S
and 2Q to be co− Z 4M
5P − 3Q 5P − 3Q = 3(P +Q) + 2P
3P − 5Q = 3(P +Q) + (−2Q) 2(5M+2S)
5Q− 3P 5Q− 3P = −(3P − 5Q)
Total 98M + 46S
The comparison table for the operation counts as given in [71] is as below:
Algorithm to compute ciP+diQ Cost when ci, di ∈ {1, 3, 5}
Longa and Gebotys [72] 129M + 95S
Lin and Zhang [71] 98M + 46S
The authors in [71] also conclude that their scheme becomes more efficient
than that of Longa and Gebotys in [72], as the window size increases.
Longa and Gebotys’ scheme can be extended when a 6= −3 and ci, di ∈ {1, 3, 5}
as follows: As suggested in [72], we can start by performing P → 2P → 4P
and then obtaining 3P and 5P using 4P ± P . Similarly, we can compute
Q→ 2Q→ 4Q and then obtain 3Q and 5Q using 4Q±Q. We structure the
complete algorithm as follows:
Result Operation Cost (when a 6= −3)
2P Doubling (1M + 5S)
4P Doubling (2M + 8S)
4P ± P Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M + 4S) + (1M +
1S)
2Q Doubling (1M + 5S)
4Q Doubling (2M + 8S)
4Q±Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M + 4S) + (1M +
1S)
P ±Q Mixed Addition(both affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(4M + 2S) + (1M +
1S)
3P ±Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M + 4S) + (1M +
1S)
P ± 3Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M + 4S) + (1M +
1S)
5P ±Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M + 4S) + (1M +
1S)
P ± 5Q Mixed Addition(one affine)
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(7M + 4S) + (1M +
1S)
3P±3Q Addition with stored values
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(9M + 3S) + (1M +
1S)
3P±5Q Addition with stored values
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(9M + 3S) + (1M +
1S)
5P±3Q Addition with stored values
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(9M + 3S) + (1M +
1S)
5P±5Q Addition with stored values
+ Conjugate Mixed Addition
(9M + 3S) + (1M +
1S)
Thus the total cost of Longa and Gebotys’ algorithm to compute ciP + diQ
when a 6= −3 and ci, di ∈ {1, 3, 5} is 99M + 75S. In [71], Lin and Zhang
provide an algorithm to do the same and the cost of their algorithm is
98M + 46S. However, Lin and Zhang’s algorithm does not compute 5P ±Q
and P ± 5Q and thus is incomplete. Therefore, it may not be appropriate
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to compare the costs between the two algorithms. If we add the cost of
computing 5P ±Q and P ± 5Q to the cost of the incomplete algorithm of Lin
and Zhang, the cost exceeds that of our adaptation of Longa and Gebotys’s
algorithm shown above. Thus, the Co-Z point arithmetic based algorithms do
not always provide better performance when compared with those constructed
using only Conjugate addition arithmetic, at least not in the two cases studied
by the authors in [71].
Chapter 6
Pairing based cryptography
6.1 Introduction
Pairing based cryptography was first introduced by Joux in his one round
Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme [56]. The Weil and the Tate
pairings are two well-known examples of pairings which are usually computed
using Miller’s algorithm, that was first described in 1986 and subsequently
published in 2004 [78]. Stange [100] proposed an alternate algorithm to
compute the Tate pairing by using Elliptic Nets which are a generalization
of integer sequences satisfying certain properties that were first studied by
Ward [104].
While Miller’s algorithm and Stange’s Elliptic Net algorithm are both
O(log n) algorithms, the Elliptic Net algorithm is slower, owing to a difference
in the constants, though it is only somewhat slower than an optimized Miller’s
algorithm, especially at higher embedding degrees [100]. There are numerous
papers published on the optimization of Miller’s algorithm [32], however,
there has not been much research published in the literature to optimize
Stange’s algorithm. This motivates the need to consider optimizations of
Stange’s algorithm. In this chapter, we provide an improved version of
Stange’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing. This improvement may not
make Stange’s method faster than that of Miller’s, but is an improvement
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worth considering, as Stange’s algorithm is the only viable alternative
to Miller’s algorithm for Pairing computation. This improvement is also
applicable to
(a) an algorithm in [59] that computes elliptic curve scalar multiplication
using an adapted version of Stange’s algorithm and
(b) the improved version of Kanayama’s version in [24].
In [110], the authors propose efficient formulae and algorithms for point
arithmetic on a new model of elliptic curves called Selmer Curves. They
also provide an algorithm for Tate pairing on these curves. We provide
an improved algorithm for point arithmetic and Tate pairing on Selmer curves.
6.2 Stange’s Elliptic Net Algorithm to
compute the Tate Pairing
Elliptic divisibility sequences are integer sequences h0, h1, h2, ..., hn, satisfying
the following two properties:
1. For all positive integers m > n,
hm+nhm−n = hm+1hm−1h2n − hn+1hn−1h2m (6.1)
2. hn divides hm whenever n divides m.
6.2.1 Stange’s Algorithm for Tate Pairing
Before we outline Stange’s algorithm, we must define the Tate pairing. Let
E be an elliptic curve defined over a field L containing the m-th roots of
unity, where m ∈ Z. Let E(L)[m] = {P ∈ E(L)|mP = O} and mE(L) =
{mP |P ∈ E(L)}. Further let P ∈ E(L)[m] and Q ∈ E(L)/mE(L). Since
mP = O, there is a rational function f with divisor div(fP ) = m(P )−m(O).
If we choose another divisor DQ defined over L such that DQ ∼ (Q)− (O)
and with support disjoint from div(fP ), the Tate pairing is the mapping
Tm : E(L)[m]× E(L)/mE(L)→ L∗/(L∗)m defined by Tm(P,Q) = fP (DQ).
The Tate pairing as well as the Weil Pairing can be computed using the
Miller’s algorithm and is a O(logm) algorithm. As stated above, whilst
constructing an algorithm to compute the Tate pairing using Elliptic Nets,
Stange provided a theorem useful in constructing the Tate pairing, which we
repeat below for convenience:
Theorem A [100]: Fix a positive m ∈ Z. Let E be an elliptic curve defined
over a finite field L containing the m-th roots of unity. Let P,Q ∈ E(L), with
[m]P = O. Choose S ∈ E(L) such that S /∈ {O, Q}. Then there exists an
elliptic net W : Zη → L and p, q, s ∈ Zη such that the quantity
Tm(P,Q) =
W (s +mp + q)W (s)
W (s +mp)W (s + q)
is exactly the Tate pairing Tm =Tm : E(L)[m]× E(L)/mE(L)→ L∗/(L∗)m.
In the above, the elliptic net W , introduced by Stange as a generalization of
Elliptic divisibility sequences, is a map W : A→ R satisfying the following
recurrence relation for p, q, r, s ∈ A, where R is an integral domain and A is
a finitely generated free abelian group.
W (p+ q + s)W (p− q)W (r + s)W (r)
+W (q + r + s)W (q − r)W (p+ s)W (p)
+W (r + p+ s)W (r − p)W (q + s)W (q) = 0 .
(6.2)
Further Stange provides the following result
Theorem B [100]: Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field L,
m a positive integer, P ∈ E(L)[m] and Q ∈ E(L). If Wp is the elliptic net
associated to E,P , then
Tm(P, P ) =
WP (m+ 2)WP (1)
WP (m+ 1)WP (2)
.
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Further if WP,Q is the elliptic net associated to E,P,Q, then
Tm(P,Q) =
WP,Q(m+ 1, 1)WP,Q(1, 0)
WP,Q(m+ 1, 0)WP,Q(1, 1)
. (6.3)
Using Shipsey’s algorithm [89] for computing terms of an elliptic divisibility
sequence and the above theorems, Stange provides a scheme that can be
used to compute the Tate pairing by calculating the terms W (m, 0) and
W (m, 1) of an elliptic net. Stange’s scheme is a O(logm) algorithm and can
be outlined as follows:
Let a block centered on k consist of the following two vectors:
(i) 8 consecutive terms of the sequence W (i, 0) centered on terms W (k, 0)
and W (k + 1, 0) called the first vector and
(ii) 3 consecutive terms W (i, 1) centered on the term W (k, 1) called the
second vector.
(k-1,1) (k, 1) (k+1,1)
(k-3,0) (k-2,0) (k-1,0) (k,0) (k+1,0) (k+2,0) (k+3,0) (k+4,0)
Figure 6.1: Block centred on k
For a block V centered on k, Stange proposes two algorithms, Double(V),
that constructs the block centered on 2k and DoubleAdd(V) that constructs
the block centered on 2k + 1. While the first vectors of Double(V) and
DoubleAdd(V) are calculated in terms of W (2, 0) and the terms of V , using
the following instances of (6.2), where i = k − 1, . . . , k + 3
W (2i− 1, 0) = W (i+ 1, 0)W (i− 1, 0)3 −W (i− 2, 0)W (i, 0)3 and (6.4)
W (2i, 0) = (W (i, 0)W (i+ 2, 0)W (i− 1, 0)2
−W (i, 0)W (i− 2, 0)W (i+ 1, 0)2)/W (2, 0) . (6.5)
The second vectors are computed, in terms of W (1, 1),W (1, 1),W (2, 1) and
the terms of V , using the following instances of (6.2) below:
W (2k − 1, 1) = (W (k + 1, 1)W (k − 1, 1)W (k − 1, 0)2
−W (k, 0)W (k − 2, 0)W (k, 1)2)/W (1, 1), (6.6)
W (2k, 1) = W (k − 1, 1)W (k + 1, 1)W (k, 0)2
−W (k − 1, 0)W (k + 1, 0)W (k, 1)2, (6.7)
W (2k + 1, 1) = (W (k − 1, 1)W (k + 1, 1)W (k + 1, 0)2
−W (k, 0)W (k + 2, 0)W (k, 1)2)/W (−1, 1), (6.8)
W (2k + 2, 1) = (W (k + 1, 0)W (k + 3, 0)W (k, 1)2
−W (k − 1, 1)W (k + 1, 1)W (k + 2, 0)2)/W (2,−1).
(6.9)
Algorithm 6.1 below calculates W (m, 1) and W (m, 0) for any positive integer
m.
Algorithm 6.1: Elliptic Net Algorithm
INPUT: Initial terms a = W (2, 0), b = W (3, 0), c = W (4, 0), d = W (2, 1),
e = W (−1, 1), f = W (2,−1), g = W (1, 1) of an elliptic net satisfying
W (1, 0) = W (0, 1) = 1 and integer m = (dkdk−1 . . . d0)2 with dk = 1
OUTPUT: Elliptic net elements W (m, 0) and W (m, 1).
1: V ← [[−a,−1, 0, 1, a, b, c, a3c− b3]; [1, g, d]]
2: for i = k − 1 down to 1 do
3: if di = 0 then
4: V ← Double(V )
5: else
6: V ← DoubleAdd(V )
7: end if
8: end for
9: return V [0, 3], V [1, 1] //terms W (m, 0) and W (m, 1) respectively
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The Tate pairing is now computed using Equation (6.3). We recall
that a Weierstrass form elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq of char not 2 or
3 is given by
y2 = x3 + Ax+B
and points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) on E(Fq) with Q 6= ±P , the values
of a, b, c, d, e, f , g must be calculated as required inputs for the Elliptic
Net Algorithm, which are the terms of the elliptic net associated to E, P ,
Q. The necessary formulae are given by the functions Ψm,0 called division
polynomials ([90, p. 105] and [91, p. 477]). We have
W (1, 0) = 1, (6.10)
W (2, 0) = 2y1, (6.11)
W (3, 0) = 3x41 + 6Ax
2
1 + 12Bx1 − A2, (6.12)
W (4, 0) = 4y1(x
6
1 + 5Ax
4
1 + 20Bx
3
1 − 5A2x21 − 4ABx1 − 8B2 − A3), (6.13)
W (0, 1) = W (1, 1) = 1, (6.14)
W (2, 1) = 2x1 + x2 −
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)2
(6.15)
W (−1, 1) = x1 − x2 and (6.16)
W (2,−1) = (y1 + y2)2 − (2x1 + x2)(x1 − x2)2. (6.17)
If P has order m and if a, b, c, d, e, f , g are given by (6.11)− (6.17) above,
the output of Algorithm 6.1 can be used to compute the Tate pairing using
Equation (6.3) above. Factoring out some common subexpressions that may
occur frequently, Stange provides an optimised version of the Double and
DoubleAdd algorithm as follows:
Algorithm 6.2: Double and DoubleAdd
INPUT: Block V centred at k of an elliptic net satisfying
W (1, 0) = W (0, 1) = 1, values α = W (2, 0)−1, E = W (−1, 1)−1,
F = W (2,−1)−1, G = W (1, 1)−1 and boolean add
OUTPUT: Block centered at 2k if add = 0 and centred at 2k + 1 if add = 1.
1. S ← [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
2. P ← [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
3. S0 ← V [1, 1]2
4. P0 ← V [1, 0]V [1, 2]
5: for i = 0 to 5 do
6: S[i]← V [0, i+ 1]2
7: P [i]← V [0, i]V [0, i+ 2]
8: end for
9: if add == 0 then
10: for i = 1 to 4 do
11: V [0, 2i− 2]← S[i− 1]P [i]− S[i]P [i− 1]
12: V [0, 2i− 1]← (S[i− 1]P [i+ 1]− S[i+ 1]P [i− 1])α
13: end for
14. V [1, 0]← (S0P [3]− S[3]P0)G
15. V [1, 1]← S[3]P0 − S0P [3]
16. V [1, 2]← (S[4]P0 − S0P [4])E
17: else
18: for i = 1 to 4 do
19: V [0, 2i− 2]← (S[i− 1]P [i+ 1]− S[i+ 1]P [i− 1])α
20: V [0, 2i− 1]← S[i]P [i+ 1]− S[i+ 1]P [i]
21: end for
22. V [1, 0]← S[3]P0 − S0P [3]
23. V [1, 1]← (S[4]P0 − S0P [4])E
24. V [1, 2]← (S0P [5]− S[5]P0)F
25: end if
26: return V
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6.2.2 Improvement to Stange’s Algorithm
Stange calculates the cost of the Double step in the above scheme to
be 6S + (6n + 26)M + Sn +
3
2Mn, while that of the DoubleAdd steps is
6S + (6n + 26)M + Sn + 2Mn where M and S are the costs of a multiplication
and squaring in Fq respectively while Mn and Sn are the costs of a multiplication
and squaring in Fqn respectively. Here for the integer m and finite field Fq, the
embedding degree n is the least integer such that m|(qn − 1). Usually for the Tate
pairing, a curve is defined over Fq of embedding degree n > 1, while P ∈ E(Fq)
and Q ∈ E(Fqn). Now Lines 10-13 of Algorithm 6.2 costs 4 ∗ 5M = 20M and can
be replaced with the following block of code
A← (P [1] + P [2])(S[1]− S[2]);
B ← (P [1]− P [2])(S[1] + S[2]);
C ← (P [1] + P [3])(S[1]− S[3]);
D ← (P [1]− P [3])(S[1] + S[3]);
E ← 2(P [2]− P [3])(S[2] + S[3]);
F ← (P [3] + P [4])(S[3]− S[4]);
G← (P [3]− P [4])(S[3] + S[4]);
H ← (P [3] + P [5])(S[3]− S[5]);
I ← (P [3]− P [5])(S[3] + S[5]);
J ← 2(P [4]− P [5])(S[4] + S[5]);
V [0, 0]← (A−B)/2;
V [0, 1]← (C −D)α/2;
V [0, 2]← ((C +D)− (A+B + E))/2;
V [0, 3]← (S[2]P [4]− S[4]P [2])α;
V [0, 4]← (F −G)/2;
V [0, 5]← (H − I)α/2;
V [0, 6]← ((H + I)− (F +G+ J))/2;
V [0, 7]← (S[4]P [6]− S[6]P [4])α;
The above block of code costs 18M , thus saving us 2M . Similarly, Lines 18-21 can
be replaced with the following block of code which again costs 18M :
A← (P [2] + P [3])(S[2]− S[3]);
B ← (P [2]− P [3])(S[2] + S[3]);
C ← (P [2] + P [4])(S[2]− S[4]);
D ← (P [2]− P [4])(S[2] + S[4]);
E ← 2(P [3]− P [4])(S[3] + S[4]);
F ← (P [4] + P [5])(S[4]− S[5]);
G← (P [4]− P [5])(S[4] + S[5]);
H ← (P [4] + P [6])(S[4]− S[6]);
I ← (P [4]− P [6])(S[4] + S[6]);
J ← 2(P [5]− P [6])(S[5] + S[6]);
V [0, 0]← (S[1]P [3]− S[3]P [1])α;
V [0, 1]← (A−B)/2;
V [0, 2]← (C −D)α/2;
V [0, 3]← ((C +D)− (A+B + E))/2;
V [0, 4]← (S[3]P [5]− S[5]P [3])α;
V [0, 5]← (F −G)/2;
V [0, 6]← (H − I)α/2;
V [0, 7]← ((H + I)− (F +G+ J))/2;
By inspection, we can see that the two blocks of code above costs 18M each. Thus
the cost of the double step in Stange’s algorithm can be reduced to 6S + (6n +
24)M + Sn +
3
2Mn, (typically n ≤ 12) while that of the DoubleAdd step can be
reduced to 6S + (6n+ 24)M + Sn + 2Mn, as summarized in the table below.
Algorithm for Tate
Pairing
Double DoubleAdd
Optimised Millers
[64]
4S + (n+ 7)M + Sn +Mn 7S+(2n+19)M+Sn+2Mn
Elliptic Net
Algorithm [100]
6S+(6n+26)M+Sn+
3
2
Mn 6S+(6n+26)M+Sn+2Mn
Improved Elliptic
Net Algorithm [96]
6S+(6n+24)M+Sn+
3
2
Mn 6S+(6n+24)M+Sn+2Mn
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While this improvement does not make the elliptic net algorithm competitive with
the Miller’s algorithm, it is an improvement worth considering as the elliptic net
algorithm is the only viable alternative to the Miller’s algorithm. A comparison
of the elliptic net algorithm with Miller’s algorithm for a range of values for the
embedding degree n can be found in [101].
Stange’s algorithm was adapted by Kanayama et al to compute elliptic curve
scalar multiplication [59]. Their Double and DoubleAdd steps costs 26M + 6S
and this can be reduced to 24M + 6S as a result of adapting the optimization
to Stange’s algorithm presented in this chapter. Kanayama’s algorithm was then
further optimized by Chen at al in [24] using one of the optimizations outlined
by Stange, which was not utilised by the authors in [59]. Using this optimization
and then replacing four multiplications with four squarings in Stange’s algorithm,
the authors in [59] reduce the cost of the both the Double and DoubleAdd steps
in Kanayama’s algorithm to 18M + 10S. Using our optimization in this chapter,
the cost of the Double and DoubleAdd steps can be reduced to 16M + 10S each.
These costs are summarized in the table below:
Elliptic Net Algorithm for Scalar Multiplication Double DoubleAdd
Kanayama’s Algorithm [59] 26M + 6S 26M + 6S
Improvement due to Chen [100] 18M + 10S 18M + 10S
Further Improvement [96] 16M + 10S 16M + 10S
6.3 Selmer Curves
We recall the definition of Selmer curves from Section 2.5
If K be a field of char 6= 2 or 3, a Selmer curve over K is defined by a homogeneous
cubic equation of the form aX3+bY 3 = cZ3, or in affine coordinates, ax3+by3 = c,
where a, b, c ∈ K and abc 6= 0.
6.3.1 Point Arithmetic on Selmer Curves
Assume P1 = (X1 : Y1 : Z1), P2 = (X2 : Y2 : Z2) and let
P1 + P2 = P3 = (X3 : Y3 : Z3), then
X3 = X1Z1Y
2
2 −X2Z2Y 21
Y3 = Y1Z1X
2
2 − Y2Z2X21
Z3 = X1Y1Z
2
2 −X2Y2Z21
Below, we replicate the algorithm to compute the above formula as provided in
[110], which costs 12M .
A = X1Y2; B = X2Y1; C = Y1Z2; D = Y2Z1; E = Z1X2; F = Z2X1;
X3 = AD −BC; Y3 = BE −AF ; Z3 = CF −DE.
Now, we provide the formulae and algorithm for point doubling on Selmer curves
as given in [110]. Assume P1 = (X1 : Y1 : Z1), 2P1 = P3 = (X3 : Y3 : Z3), then
X3 = Y1(2X
3
1 + Y
3
1 )
Y3 = X1(X
3
1 + 2Y
3
1 )
Z3 = Z1(X
3
1 − Y 31 ).
The above doubling formula can be computed using the following algorithm, which
costs 5M + 2S:
A = X21 ; B = Y
2
1 ; C = AX1; D = BY1;
X3 = Y1(2C +D); Y3 = X1(C + 2D); Z3 = Z1(C −D).
Below we provide a new algorithm for point addition on Selmer Curves:
A = X1Y2; B = X2Y1; C = Y1Z2; D = Y2Z1; E = Z1X2; F = Z2X1;
G = (B +D)(A− C); H = (B −D)(A+ C); I = (B + F )(A− E);
J = (B − F )(A+ E); K = (D − F )(C + E);
2X3 = (G−H); 2Y3 = (J − I); 2Z3 = (I + J)− (G+H + 2K) .
This algorithm costs 11M , thus saving us 1M . It should be noted that we
have actually computed 2X3, 2Y3, 2Z3. If Z2 = 1, then the new algorithm costs 9M .
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6.3.2 Cost of Tate Pairing on Selmer Curves
The authors in [110] use Miller’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing on Selmer
curves. Using the same notation as in the previous section, the total cost of a Miller
addition step (ADD) as given in [110] is Mn + (n+ 12)M , where Mn and M denote
multiplication in Fpn and Fp respectively. If Z2 = 1 then the authors in [110] show
that the cost of mixed Miller addition (mADD) is reduced to Mn + (n + 10)M .
If we use the new algorithm for point addition presented above, then the new
total cost of a Miller addition step (ADD) is Mn + (n + 11)M . If Z2 = 1, then
the new cost of mixed Miller addition (mADD) is Mn + (n+ 9)M . The authors
in [110] show that Selmer curves are very competitive with the fastest formulae,
by comparing the cost of computing the Tate pairing on other forms of Elliptic
curves. They summarize the cost of Tate pairing computation as shown in the table
below, whilst not including the common cost 1Mn + nM in Miller addition step
and 1Mn + 1S + nM in Miller doubling step. T1 is the scenario when S = 0.8M
and T2 is the scenario when S = M . As per their analysis, computation of Tate
pairing would be the fastest on Selmer curves in the T2 scenario. With our new
algorithm in this chapter[96], computation of Tate pairing on Selmer curves would
be the fastest under both scenarios, T1 and T2.
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Chapter 7
Some Results Arising from
Karatsuba Multiplication
We know that improving Finite Field Arithmetic is crucial to improving
implementations of elliptic curve cryptography. One of the frequently used
arithmetic operations in cryptography is multiplication and any optimization of
this operation facilitates the faster execution of cryptographic algorithms. The
literature is abundant with ideas to multiply two integers in a variety of ways - for
instance, Karatsuba’s algorithm, the Toom-Cook family and fast multiplication via
FFT. Though Toom-Cook or the FFT methods are more efficient asymptotically,
compared to Karatsuba’s algorithm, it is beneficial to extend and optimize the latter
as it outperforms the former on number sizes used in current day cryptosystems [28].
The similarity between multi-precision arithmetic and polynomial arithmetic
makes it easy to adapt Karatsuba’s algorithm to multiply polynomials. Indeed,
it is simpler in the context of polynomial multiplication because of the lack of
carries. Karatsuba’s algorithm has been generalized by Weimerskirch and Paar
[105] to multiply two polynomials of arbitrary degree. In [82], Montgomery gives
formulae to multiply polynomials of degree 2, degree 4, degree 5 and degree 6.
Montgomery’s formulae for degree 5 and degree 6 require fewer multiplications
and additions and are more efficient than the Karatsuba generalizations obtained
by Weimerskirch and Paar. Though the origin of the Montgomery family of
formulae for degree 2 polynomials appears cryptic at first, they can be derived from
Karatsuba’s algorithm as shown in this chapter. We also present new families of
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formulae to multiply degree 2 polynomials, distinct from the Montgomery family.
7.1 Review of Karatsuba’s Algorithm
Karatsuba’s algorithm performs the multiplication of two numbers of size 2n
using three multiplications of two numbers of size n each. The algorithm is
applied recursively until n is sufficiently small. Thus the time complexity is O(nα)
where α = ln 3/ln 2 ' 1.57. An interesting history of this algorithm, along with
Kolmogorov’s conjecture appears in [61]. This algorithm devised by Karatsuba
in 1963 appears to be the first multiplication algorithm that has sub-quadratic
complexity.
If two numbers A and B of the same length are to be multiplied, then these two
numbers can be split as follows:
A = xA1 +A0 and B = xB1 +B0
where x is a power of the base in use (for binary numbers, the base is 2)
and x is about half the length of the two numbers. The conventional school
book multiplication algorithm requires 4 multiplications and 3 additions. If
A(x) = xA1 + A0 and B(x) = xB1 + B0 were polynomials over a ring R, then
computing A(x)B(x) would require 4 multiplications and 1 addition.
A(x)B(x) = x2A1B1 + x(A0B1 +A1B0) +A0B0
Karatsuba’s algorithm makes use of the fact that AB can be written as
A(x)B(x) = x2A1B1 + x[(A1 +A0)(B0 +B1)−A0B0 −A1B1] +A0B0 (7.1)
or
A(x)B(x) = x2A1B1 + x[(A1 −A0)(B0 −B1) +A0B0 +A1B1] +A0B0 (7.2)
The Karatsuba’s algorithm(referred to as 2-way KA hereafter) requires 3
multiplications and 4 additions.
The 3-way KA multiplies two degree-2 polynomials as follows
A(x) = x2A2 + xA1 +A0 and B(x) = x
2B2 + xB1 +B0
By the conventional school book multiplication method, AB can be written as
A(x)B(x) = x4A2B2+x
3(A2B1 +A1B2)+
x2(A2B0 +A1B1 +A0B2) + x(A1B0 +A0B1) +A0B0
This method requires 9 multiplications and 4 additions.
A Karatsuba-like formula[82] can be written as follows
A(x)B(x) = x4A2B2 + x
3[(A1 +A2)(B1 +B2)−A1B1 −A2B2]
+ x2[(A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)−A2B2 −A0B0 +A1B1]
+ x[(A0 +A1)(B0 +B1)−A1B1 −A0B0] +A0B0 (7.3)
or
A(x)B(x) = x4A2B2 + x
3[(A2 −A1)(B1 −B2) +A1B1 +A2B2]
+ x2[(A2 −A0)(B0 −B2) +A2B2 +A0B0 +A1B1]
+ x[(A1 −A0)(B0 −B1) +A1B1 +A0B0] +A0B0 (7.4)
The above set of formulae ((7.3) and (7.4)) are the 3-way KA formula and require
6 multiplications and 13 additions.
7.2 3-way KA from 2-way KA
Chung and Hassan [26] depict the 3-way KA as a special case of Montgomery’s
family of 3-way multiplication algorithms. They further suggest that the 3-way
KA does not appear to be a special case of Toom-Cook even though, many fast
multiplication algorithms are related to the Toom-Cook multiplication algorithm.
The Toom-Cook algorithm relies on the fact that the product of two polynomials
A(x) = an−1xn−1 + an−2xn−2 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0 and B(x) = bn−1xn−1 + bn−2xn−2 +
· · · + b1x + b0 given by C(x) = A(x)B(x) is recovered by its values at (2n − 1)
distinct values of x. Here we show that the 3-way KA can in fact be derived by
repeated applications of the 2-way KA. We know that
A(x)B(x) = x4A2B2 + x
3(A2B1 +A1B2)
+ x2(A2B0 +A1B1 +A0B2) + x(A1B0 +A0B1) +A0B0 (7.5)
117
The 2-way KA relies on the fact that A0B1 +A1B0, can be written as
(A1 −A0)(B0 −B1) +A0B0 +A1B1
In general, the 2-way KA is based on the following identity:
AiBj +AjBi = (Ai −Aj)(Bj −Bi) +AjBj +AiBi (7.6)
Using (7.6), Equation (7.5) can be written as (in this section, the term underlined
by the bracket is rewritten repeatedly using the above identity)
A(x)B(x) = x4A2B2 + x
3 (A2B1 +A1B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸+x2(A2B0 +A1B1 +A0B2)
+ x(A1B0 +A0B1) +A0B0
= (x4 + x3)A2B2 + x
3[(A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)] + (x2 + x3)A1B1
+ x2 (A2B0 +A0B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸+x(A1B0 +A0B1) +A0B0
= (x4 + x3)A2B2 + x
3[(A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)] + (x2 + x3)A1B1
+ x2[(A2 −A0)(B0 −B2)]
+ x2A2B2 + x (A1B0 +A0B1)︸ ︷︷ ︸+A0B0 + x2A0B0
= (x4 + x3 + x2)A2B2 + x
3[(A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)] + (x3 + x2)A1B1
+ x2[(A2 −A0)(B0 −B2)] + (x2 + 1)A0B0
+ x[(A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)] + xA1B1 + xA0B0
= (x4 + x3 + x2)A2B2 + x
3[(A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)] + (x3 + x2 + x)A1B1
+ x2[(A2 −A0)(B0 −B2)] + (x2 + x+ 1)A0B0
+ x[(A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)]
= x4A2B2 + x
3[(A2 −A1)(B1 −B2) +A2B2 +A1B1]
+ x2[(A2 −A0)(B0 −B2) +A2B2 +A0B0 +A1B1]
+ x[(A1 −A0)(B0 −B1) +A0B0 +A1B1] +A0B0
(7.7)
Thus the 3-way KA is the result of repeated applications of 2-way KA.
In fact, the entire Montgomery family of formulae to multiply two polynomials of
degree 2, can be obtained from the Karatsuba algorithm. For this, we first show
the extension of Karatsuba’s algorithm to multiply polynomials of degree 3.
If A(x) = (x3A3 + x
2A2 + xA1 +A0) and B(x) = (x
3B3 + x
2B2 + xB1 +B0) then,
A(x)B(x) = (x3A3 + x
2A2 + xA1 +A0)(x
3B3 + x
2B2 + xB1 +B0)
= [x2(xA3 +A2) + (xA1 +A0)][x
2(xB3 +B2) + (xB1 +B0)]
= (x2M1 +M0)(x
2N1 +N0)
where M1 = xA3 +A2,M0 = xA1 +A0, N1 = xB3 +B2, N0 = xB1 +B0
= x4M1N1 + x
2(M1N0 +M0N1︸ ︷︷ ︸) +M0N0
= x4M1N1 + x
2[(M1 +M0)(N0 +N1)−M0N0 −M1N1] +M0N0
Now
M0N0 = (xA1 +A0)(xA1 +B0)
= x2A1B1 + x(A0B1 +B0A1︸ ︷︷ ︸) +A0B0
= x2A1B1 + x[(A0 +A1)(B1 +B0)−A0B0 −A1B1] +A0B0
Also
(M1 +M0)(N0 +N1) = (xA3 +A2 + xA1 +A0)(xB3 +B2 + xB1 +B0)
= [x(A1 +A3) + (A0 +A2)][x(B1 +B3) + (B0 +B2)]
= x2(A1 +A3)(B1 +B3)
+ x[(A1 +A3)(B0 +B2) + (B1 +B3)(A0 +A2)︸ ︷︷ ︸]
+ (A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)
(7.8)
= x2(A1 +A3)(B1 +B3) + x[(A1 +A3) + (A0 +A2)][(B0 +B2) + (B1 +B3)]
− x(A1 +A3)(B1 +B3)− x(A0 +A2)(B0 +B2) + (A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)
M1N1 remains to be evaluated:
M1N1 = (xA3 +A2)(xB3 +B2) = x
2A3B3 + x(A3B2 +A2B3︸ ︷︷ ︸) +A2B2
= x2A3B3 + x[(A3 +A2)(B2 +B3)−A2B2 −A3B3] +A2B2
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Defining
D0 = A0B0 D4 = (A0 +A1)(B1 +B0)
D1 = A1B1 D5 = (A0 +A2)(B2 +B0)
D2 = A2B2 D6 = (A1 +A3)(B3 +B1)
D3 = A3B3 D7 = (A3 +A2)(B2 +B3)
D8 = [(A1 +A3) + (A0 +A2)][(B1 +B3) + (B0 +B2)]
we can write
M0N0 = x
2D1 + x(D4 −D0 −D1) +D0
M1N1 = x
2D3 + x(D7 −D2 −D3) +D2
and (M1 +M0)(N0 +N1) = x
2D6 + x(D8 −D6 −D5) +D5
The product AB can now be written as
A(x)B(x) =x4[x2D3 + x(D7 −D2 −D3) +D2]
+ x2{[x2D6 + x(D8 −D6 −D5) +D5]
− [x2D1 + x(D4 −D0 −D1) +D0]
− [x2D3 + x(D7 −D2 −D3) +D2]}
+ [x2D1 + x(D4 −D0 −D1) +D0]
A(x)B(x) = x6D3 + x
5(D7 −D2 −D3) + x4(D6 −D1 −D3 +D2)
+ x3(D8 −D6 −D5 −D4 +D0 +D1 +D2 −D7 +D3)
+ x2(D5 −D0 −D2 +D1) + x(D4 −D0 −D1) +D0
(7.9)
The above method obtained from 2-way KA can be called 4-way KA and was
known to Winograd in 1980 [107]. The 4-way KA is effectively a formula to
multiply two polynomials of degree 3.
Another special case of Montgomery’s family of formulae for multiplying quadratics
can be obtained from the 4-way KA by assigning A3 = 0 and B3 = 0. Thus
equation (7.9) reduces to
A(x)B(x) = x4D2+x
3(D8 −D5 −D4 +D0)
+x2(D5 −D0 −D2 +D1) + x(D4 −D0 −D1) +D0
because
D3 = A3B3 = 0
D7 = (A3 +A2)(B2 +B3) = A2B2 = D2
D6 = (A1 +A3)(B3 +B1) = A1B1 = D1
i.e.,
A(x)B(x) = x4D2 + x
3[(A0 +A1 +A2)(B0 +B1 +B2)
− (A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)− (A0 +A1)(B1 +B0) +A0B0
+ x2[(A0 +A2)(B2 +B0)−A0B0 −A2B2 +A1B1]
+ x[(A0 +A1)(B1 +B0)−A0B0 −A1B1] +A0B0]
which is a special case of Montgomery’s family of formula. Now we have the identity
A0B0 +A1B1 +A2B2 − (A0 +A1)(B0 +B1)− (A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)
− (A1 +A2)(B1 +B2) + (A0 +A1 +A2)(B0 +B1 +B2) = 0 (7.10)
Multiplying (7.10) by any polynomial C with integer coefficients, and adding it
to (7.3), we obtain the entire Montgomery family of formulae for multiplying 2
quadratics.
7.3 New Family of Formulae to multiply two
quadratics
A new family of formulae to multiply two quadratics is as follows [95]:
A(x)B(x) =A0B0(C + 1− x2 − x)
+A1B1(3C − x+ x2 − x3)
+A2B2(C + x
4 − x3 − x2)
+ (A0 +A1)(B0 +B1)(−C + x)
+ (A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)(C + x
2)
+ (A1 +A2)(B1 +B2)(−C + x3)
+ (A1 −A0 −A2)(B0 +B2 −B1)C
(7.11)
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This follows from
A(x)B(x) = x4A2B2 + x
3[(A1 −A0 −A2)(B0 +B2 −B1) + (A0 +A2)(B2 +B0)
− (A0 +A1)(B0 +B1) +A0B0 + 2A1B1]
+ x2[(A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)−A2B2 +A1B1 −A0B0]
+ x[(A0 +A1)(B0 +B1)−A1B1 −A0B0] +A0B0
(7.12)
and
[A0B0 + 3A1B1 +A2B2 − (A0 +A1)(B0 +B1) + (A0 +A2)(B0 +B2)
− (A1 +A2)(B1 +B2) + (A1 −A0 −A2)(B0 +B2 −B1)] = 0 (7.13)
Multiplying equation (7.13) by C and adding it to (7.4), we obtain the above family
of formulae.
Equation(7.12) is obtained by writing (A1 +A3)(B0 +B2) + (B4 +B3)(A0 +A2)
as [(A1 +A3)− (A0 +A2)][(B0 +B2)− (B1 +B2)] + (A1 +A3)(B1 +B2) + (A0 +
A2)(B0 +B2) in equation (7.8).
Yet another family of formulae to multiply two quadratics is
A(x)B(x) =A0B0(C + 1 + x+ x
2)
+A1B1(−C + x+ x2 + x3)
+A2B2(−C + x2 + x3 + x4)
+ (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)(−C + x)
+ (A0 −A2)(B2 −B0)(C + x2)
+ (A1 −A2)(B2 −B1)(−C + x3)
+ (A0 −A1 −A2)(B0 −B1 −B2)C ,
(7.14)
where C is any polynomial with integer coefficients.
The efficiency of the new family of formulae introduced in this section to multiply
two quadratics is similar to that of the Montgomery family of formulae to multiply
two quadratics [82].
7.4 Extension of 2-way KA and 3-way KA to
multiply three numbers
The 2-way KA can be extended to multiply 3 integers. If A, B and C are written
as A = xA1 +A0, B = xB1 +B0, C = xC1 + C0 then
ABC = (xA1 +A0)(xB1 +B0)(xC1 + C0)
= x3A1B1C1 + x
2(A1B1C0 +A1B0C1 +A0B1C1)
+ x(A1B0C0 +A0B0C1 +A0B1C0) +A0B0C0 .
(7.15)
The above conventional school book algorithm requires 8 multiplications and 4
additions.
Using the 2-way KA, we can write the product ABC as
ABC = x3D0 + x
2[D0 +D1 +D2 +D3] + x[D1 +D4 +D5 +D2] +D5 (7.16)
where
D0 = A1B1C1, D3 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)C1,
D1 = A1B1C0, D4 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)C0,
D2 = A0B0C1, D5 = A0B0C0,
and this requires 6 multiplications and 8 additions. The above equation
can also be written as
ABC = x3D0 + x
2[D5 + 2D0 +D3 +D6] + x[D0 + 2D5 +D4 +D6] +D5 (7.17)
where D6 = (A0B0 −A1B1)(C1 − C0)
The product ABC can also be computed by first computing AB and then computing
ABC. The product ABC can be written as
ABC = (x2A1B1 + x(A0B1 +A1B0) +A0B0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
requires 3 multiplications and 4 additions using 2-way KA
(xC1 + C0)
= x2A1B1(xC1 + C0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
requires 2 multiplications
+
{
x(A0B1 +A1B0) +A0B0
}
(xC1 + C0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
requires 3 multiplications and 4 additions using 2-way KA
Thus ABC can be computed using 8 multiplications and 9 additions which is
more expensive than 6 multiplications and 8 additions that is incurred using the
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three-term product computed using equation (7.16).
Using equation (7.17) to multiply two numbers, of size 2n each, one would require
3 multiplications of two numbers of size n each and 5 multiplications of two
numbers, where one number is of size 2n and the other of size n.
Multiplication of two numbers
each of size n
Multiplication of two numbers (one
of size 2n and other of size n)
G0 = A0B0 D5 = G0C0
G1 = A1B1 D0 = G1C1
G01 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1) D4 = G01C0
D3 = G01C1
D6 = (G0 −G1)(C1 − C0)
The 3-way KA also can be extended to multiply 3 integers. If A, B and C can be
written as
A = x2A2 + xA1 +A0
B = x2B2 + xB1 +B0
C = x2C2 + xC1 + C0
then
ABC = (x2A2 + xA1 +A0)(x
2B2 + xB1 +B0)(x
2C2 + xC1 + C0)
= x6A2B2C2 + x
5(A2B2C1 +A2B1C2 +A1B2C2)
+ x4(A2B2C0 +A2B1C1 +A2B0C2
+A1B2C1 +A1B1C2 +A0B2C2)
+ x3(A2B1C0 +A2B0C1 +A1B2C0
+A1B1C1 +A1B0C2 +A0B2C1 +A0B1C2)
+ x2(A2B0C0 +A1B1C0 +A1B0C1 +A0B2C0 +A0B1C1 +A0B0C2)
+ x(A1B0C0 +A0B1C0 +A0B0C1) +A0B0C0 .
(7.18)
The above conventional school book multiplication algorithm needs 27
multiplications and 20 additions. If we define the auxiliary products
D0 = A0B0C0 D9 = (A2 −A0)(B0 −B2)C2
D1 = A0B0C1 D10 = (A2 −A0)(B0 −B2)C1
D2 = A0B0C2 D11 = (A2 −A0)(B0 −B2)C0
D3 = A1B1C0 D12 = (A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)C2
D4 = A1B1C1 D13 = (A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)C1
D5 = A1B1C2 D14 = (A2 −A1)(B1 −B2)C0
D6 = A2B2C0 D15 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)C2
D7 = A2B2C1 D16 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)C1
D8 = A2B2C2 D17 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1)C0
then
ABC =x6D8 + x
5(D8 +D12 +D5 +D7)
+ x4(D9 +D8 +D2 +D5 +D13 +D4 +D6 +D7)
+ x3(D10 +D2 +D15 +D14 +D5 +D7 +D1 +D6 +D3 +D4)
+ x2(D11 +D2 +D1 +D6 +D16 +D4 +D0 +D3)
+ x(D17 +D3 +D0 +D1) +D0 .
(7.19)
This requires 18 multiplications and 29 additions. In the above formula, the
following pairs of auxiliary products can be combined: (D1, D3), (D2, D6) and
(D5, D7)
D1 +D3 = (A1B1 −A0B0)(C0 − C1) +A1B1C1 +A0B0C0
D2 +D6 = (A0B0 −A2B2)(C2 − C0) +A0B0C0 +A2B2C2
D5 +D7 = (A1B1 −A2B2)(C2 − C1) +A1B1C1 +A2B2C2
Assigning
E10 = (A1B1 −A0B0)(C0 − C1)
E02 = (A0B0 −A2B2)(C2 − C0)
E12 = (A1B1 −A2B2)(C2 − C1)
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we have
D1 +D3 = E10 +D4 +D0
D2 +D6 = E02 +D0 +D8
D5 +D7 = E12 +D4 +D8
Thus
ABC = x6D8 + x
5[2D8 +D12 +D4 + E12]
+ x4[D9 + 3D8 + E02 +D0 + E12 + 2D4 +D13]
+ x3[D10 + E02 + 2D0 + 2D8
+D15 +D14 + E12 + 3D4 + E10]
+ x2[D11 + E02 + 3D0 +D8 + E10 + 2D4 +D16]
+ x[D17 + E10 +D4 + 2D0] +D0
(7.20)
Using this formula to multiply 3 numbers of size 3n each, one would require 12
multiplications of 3 numbers of size n each, 3 multiplications of 2 numbers, where
one is of the size 2n and the other of size n and 3 multiplications of 2 numbers of
size n each.
The above formula can also be realized using 6 multiplications of 2 numbers, each
of size n and (9 + 6) multiplications of two numbers, one of size 2n and other of
size n, as shown in the table below
Multiplications of two
numbers each of size n
Multiplication of two numbers (one
of size 2n and other of size n)
G0 = A0B0 D0 = G0C0
G1 = A1B1 D4 = G1C1
G2 = A2B2 D8 = G2C2
G02 = (A2 −A0)(B0 −B2) D9 = G02C2
D10 = G02C1
D11 = G02C0
G01 = (A2 −A1)(B1 −B2) D12 = G01C2
D13 = G01C1
D14 = G01C0
G10 = (A1 −A0)(B0 −B1) D15 = G10C2
D16 = G10C1
D17 = G10C0
E10 = (G1 −G0)(C0 − C1)
E02 = (G0 −G2)(C2 − C0)
E12 = (G1 −G2)(C2 − C1)
7.5 Extended Karatsuba Algorithm: Uses
and comparison with the School Book
Algorithm
Fast multiplication of 3 integers can be used in the following circumstances:
MultiPrime RSA: MultiPrime RSA is a variant of conventional RSA, where the
modulus can be the product of more than two primes. i.e., N = p1, p2 . . . pr and
φ(N) = (p1 − 1)(p2 − 1)(p3 − 1) . . . (pr − 1)
Encryption and Decryption are the same as in conventional RSA. In [69, Section 4],
the author compares the security levels offered by symmetric cryptosystems such
as DES or AES with RSA. The author recommends that the number of factors of
the MultiPrime RSA Modulus can range from 2 to 6 [Table 1,2 and 3 in [69]] and
that they should more or less be of the same size. The extended versions of 2-way
KA or 3-way KA to multiply 3 integers could be utilized to multiply the RSA factors.
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Modular Arithmetic: The Chinese Reminder Theorem is extensively used in
current day cryptography and may involve multiplication of 3 numbers or more.
For instance, the CRT is used in various variants of RSA such as Batch RSA,
MultiPower RSA, MultiPrime RSA etc [14]. The extended versions of KA to
multiply 3 integers could be utilized in this situation as well.
Below, we compare the Karatsuba algorithm with conventional School Book
Algorithm under different situations.
1. 2-way KA v/s School Book to multiply 2 degree-1 polynomials:
#MUL #ADD
School Book 4 1
2-way KA 3 4
If TMUL and TADD can be taken to denote the time for one multiplication
and one addition respectively, then the cost of the School Book Algorithm
is COSTSB = 4TMUL + 3TADD and that of the Karatsuba Algorithm is
COSTKA = 3TMUL + 4TADD. The Karatsuba Algorithm is cheaper if COSTSB is
greater than COSTKA and this would occur if TMUL/TADD is > 3.
2. 3-way KA v/s School Book to multiply 2 degree-2 polynomials:
#MUL #ADD
School Book 9 4
3-way KA 6 13
In this case COSTSB is greater than COSTKA when TMUL/TADD > 3.
3. 2-way KA v/s School Book to multiply 3 degree-1 polynomials:
#MUL #ADD
School Book 8 4
2-way KA 6 8
In this case COSTSB is greater than COSTKA when TMUL/TADD is greater than 2.
4. 3-way KA v/s School Book to multiply 3 degree-2 polynomials:
#MUL #ADD
School Book 27 20
3-way KA 18 29
In this case COSTSB is greater than COSTKA when TMUL/TADD is greater than 1.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis, we looked at point arithmetic formulae and some scalar multiplication
algorithms. We also considered double scalar multiplication algorithms in the
context of differential addition chains and algorithms to compute pairings. Whilst
doing so, we have touched upon a very small fraction of the literature in this
area. Recalling Lang’s comment(see Sec 1.2), it appears that it is possible to write
endlessly on elliptic curve arithmetic and opportunities to improve this arithmetic.
In Chapter 2, we provided an introduction to elliptic curve arithmetic formulae
and provided improved formulae for point quintupling. A systematic analysis of
the minimum number of arithmetic operations to compute bilinear forms [107] may
yield further improvements in the algorithms to perform elliptic curve arithmetic.
In Chapter 3, we provided differential point tripling formulae for Montgomery
curves which can be used in Montgomery’s PRAC algorithm which is an Euclidean
chain algorithm. A topic for future research is to derive similar formulae for other
forms of Elliptic curves with differential addition formulae. We also provided
improved faster differential arithmetic algorithms for Edwards curves.
In Chapter 4, we provided 3-dimensional extensions of 2-dimensional binary
differential chains. While we focused on left-to-right algorithms, one can work
toward constructing 3-dimensional extensions of right-to-left algorithms. A topic
for future research is the construction of 3-dimensional extensions of 2-dimensional
Euclidean differential chains. We also observed that differential tripling can be
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useful in Euclidean differential chains.
The precomputation schemes in Chapter 5 focus on double scalar multiplication
and we showed that the Co-Z precomputation scheme due to Lin and Zhang is
incorrect. We provided a new algorithm for precomputation. Further research can
focus on extending these precomputation schemes to triple and higher dimensional
precomputation schemes.
In Chapter 6, we provided an improvement of Stange’s elliptic net algorithm
to compute the Tate pairing. We also improved the computation of the Tate
pairing on Selmer curves. Stange’s elliptic net algorithm was based on Shipsey’s
double-and-add algorithm to compute terms of an elliptic divisibility sequence. It
would be interesting to research the benefits of using a Euclidean chain algorithm
to compute terms of an elliptic divisibility sequence.
Finally, we provide a new family of formulae to multiply two quadratics in Chapter
7. We provide an extension of 2-way KA and 3-way KA to multiply three numbers.
Appendix
Algorithm A.1: L-R 3-Dimensional
Montgomery Ladder
INPUT: Points P , Q, R on Em and positive integers k, l, u;
k = (kt · · · k1, k0)2, l = (lt · · · l1, l0)2, u = (ut · · ·u1, u0)2;
(at least one of kt or lt or ut = 1).
Precompute A← (P +Q), B ← (P −Q), C ← (P +R), D ← (P −R),
E ← (Q+R), F ← (Q−R), G← (P +Q+R), H ← (P +Q−R);
OUTPUT: x coordinate of W = kP + lQ+ uR.
[Initialize]
if (kt, lt, ut) = (0, 0, 1)
T0 ← O, T1 ← R, T2 ← E, T3 ← C, T4 ← G;
else if (kt, lt, ut) = (0, 1, 0)
T0 ← O, T1 ← Q, T2 ← E, T3 ← A, T4 ← G;
else if (kt, lt, ut) = (0, 1, 1)
T0 ← O, T1 ← R, T2 ← Q, T3 ← E, T4 ← G;
else if (kt, lt, ut) = (1, 0, 0)
T0 ← O, T1 ← P , T2 ← C, T3 ← A, T4 ← G;
else if (kt, lt, ut) = (1, 0, 1)
T0 ← O, T1 ← R, T2 ← P , T3 ← C, T4 ← G;
else if (kt, lt, ut) = (1, 1, 0)
T0 ← O, T1 ← Q, T2 ← P , T3 ← A, T4 ← G;
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else if (kt, lt, ut) = (1, 1, 1)
T0 ← R, T1 ← E, T2 ← C, T3 ← A, T4 ← G;
[Process the three scalar bits simultaneously]
for i from t down to 1
T0Tmp ← T0, T1Tmp ← T1, T2Tmp ← T2, T3Tmp ← T3, T4Tmp ← T4 ;
if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T3 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(P),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(F), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(F), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T3 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(F),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(P),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← 2T0Tmp, T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(F),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(H);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← 2T1Tmp ,
T2 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp,(E), T3 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← 2T1Tmp,
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(Q), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(Q), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← 2T1Tmp,
T2 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T3 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← 2T1Tmp,
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
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else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(R), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← 2T1Tmp, T1 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(B);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E),
T2 ← 2T1Tmp, T3 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T4 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← 2T1Tmp,
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E),
T2 ← 2T1Tmp, T3 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(Q), T1 ← 2T1Tmp,
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(C);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T2 ← 2T3Tmp, T3 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R),
T2 ← 2T3Tmp, T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(C),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(C),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
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else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(E), T1 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(C),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q), T1 ← 2T3Tmp,
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(C),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(P);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(C),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T3 ← 2T1Tmp,
T4 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(C),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(C),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T3 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← 2T1Tmp,
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(C),
T2 ← 2T1Tmp, T3 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T1Tmp+T0Tmp(P), T1 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← 2T1Tmp, T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T2Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T2Tmp+T1Tmp(R), T3 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(Q),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T3 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R),
T2 ← 2T3Tmp, T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
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else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(C), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(R), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T1 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(A),
T2 ← 2T3Tmp, T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(Q);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T3 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(Q),
T4 ← 2T3Tmp;
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T3 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(Q),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(Q), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(Q), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(G), T1 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(C),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(E), T3 ← 2T3Tmp,
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R);
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D), T3 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(F),
T4 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R)
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(Q),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(P), T3 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D), T3 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(F),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(Q), T3 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(F), T3 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(Q),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
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else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
T0 ← T3Tmp+T0Tmp(H), T1 ← T3Tmp+T1Tmp(D),
T2 ← T3Tmp+T2Tmp(F), T3 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
else if (ki, li, ui, ki−1, li−1, ui−1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
T0 ← T4Tmp+T0Tmp(A), T1 ← T4Tmp+T1Tmp(P),
T2 ← T4Tmp+T2Tmp(Q), T3 ← T4Tmp+T3Tmp(R),
T4 ← 2T4Tmp;
end for
[Finalize]
if (k0, l0, u0) = (0, 0, 0)
W ← 2T0
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (0, 0, 1)
W ← T1 + T0 (R)
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (0, 1, 0)
W ← T1 + T0 (Q)
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (0, 1, 1)
W ← T3 + T0 (E)
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (1, 0, 0)
W ← T1 + T0 (P)
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (1, 0, 1)
W ← T3 + T0 (C)
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (1, 1, 0)
W ← T3 + T0 (A)
else if (k0, l0, u0) = (1, 1, 1)
W ← T3 + T0 (H)
Return x−coordinate of W by computing x = X/Z
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